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INTRODUCTION
Many employees regularly face significant difficulty balancing their
work and family responsibilities. In a recent national survey, thirty percent
of adults stated that they had experienced some work-family conflict during
the course of the previous week.1 The difficulty Americans encounter
balancing work and family is not surprising since the vast majority of
working Americans are often responsible for providing care to their
children, elderly parents, or disabled family members.2
In recent years, both scholars and the media have focused considerable
attention on the work-family conflict in general, and specifically, on the
failure of the American workplace to adequately accommodate the needs of
working parents.3 Scholars have recognized that the long hours Americans
1. See JODY HEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP: WHY AMERICA’S WORKING FAMILIES
ARE IN JEOPARDY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 164 (2000).
2. See id. (noting that the need to care for family members is prevalent among
Americans regardless of factors such as race, gender, education, or income level).
3. E.g., ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE
REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989) [hereinafter HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT]; ARLIE
RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES
WORK (1997) [hereinafter HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND]; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING
GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000)
[hereinafter WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER]; Rachel Arnow-Richman Accommodation
Subverted: The Future of Work/Family Initiatives in a “Me Inc.” World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN
& L. 345 (2003); Martha Chamallas, Mothers and Disparate Treatment: The Ghost of
Martin Marietta, 44 VILL. L. REV. 337 (1999); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family:
Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 431 (1990); Laura T. Kessler, The
Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the
Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (2001); Peggie
R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-Family Conflict:
Lessons from Religious Accommodation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443; Joan Williams & Nancy
Segal, Beyond The Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated
Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77 (2003) [hereinafter Williams & Segal,
Maternal Wall]; Joan Williams, Canaries in the Mine: Work/Family Conflict and the Law,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2221 (2002) [hereinafter Williams, Canaries]; Stephanie Armour,
Some Moms Quit as Offices Scrap Family-Friendliness, USA TODAY, May 4, 2004, at A1,
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work combined with the inflexibility of the American workplace cause
significant difficulty for working parents.4 All too often parents who need
time off from work to care for their children may risk losing their jobs.
Two federal statutes, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)5 and
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VII),6 address the needs of
working parents to some extent. However, both of these statutes have
failed to provide meaningful accommodation for the majority of working
parents.7 The FMLA does not provide leave for routine childcare
obligations, but rather only permits a parent to take unpaid leave for the
birth or adoption of a child,8 or to care for a child who has a serious
illness.9 The FMLA is further limited by the fact that it does not cover the
majority of American employees.10
Title VII, an antidiscrimination statute, is limited by its focus on formal
equality, which essentially requires that employers treat similarly situated
employees in a similar manner11 and courts interpreting Title VII are
generally reluctant to require differential treatment.12 Furthermore, as an
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2004-05-03-working-moms_
x.htm; Lisa Belkin, Q: Why Don’t More Women Get to the Top?, A: They Chose Not To:
Abandoning the Climb and Heading Home, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, at 42; Lynn
Crawford Cook, A Time to Come Home, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at HE01. While the
author recognizes that there are family obligations other than parental responsibilities that
should also be accommodated in the workplace, such as caring for an ill parent, spouse, or
other relative, this Article focuses specifically on the issue of parental accommodation in the
workplace.
4. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that jobs now require longer hours,
including nighttime and weekend hours); Smith, supra note 3, at 1452-54 (describing how
parents have resorted to a number of make-shift solutions, such as dual-income earners
working opposite shifts in an attempt at adapting to the problems of balancing work with
childcare responsibilities).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (2000).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
7. See infra Part III (detailing the inadequacies of the FMLA and Title VII with
respect to addressing the work-family conflict).
8. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1)(A)-(B) (allowing twelve weeks of unpaid leave during
the course of a year for birth or adoption).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
10. The FMLA only covers employers with fifty or more employees and only covers
employees who have worked at least 1,250 hours during the preceding year. 29 U.S.C. §
2611(4)(A)(i). As a result, only about one-half of the American workforce is eligible for
leave under the FMLA. Nancy E. Dowd, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Ten
Years of Experience: Race, Gender, and Work/Family Policy, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
219, 238 n.84 (2004) (explaining that while two-thirds of employees work for covered
employers, only one-half are eligible to take leave due to the requirements regarding hours
worked and time on the job). Workers with higher income and educational levels tend to
meet eligibility requirements more often than those with lower income and educational
levels. Id.
11. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 438-39 (presenting a feminist critique that, due to its
adherence to formal equality, Title VII fails to notice real differences, such as women’s
disproportionate role in caregiving).
12. See Karen Engel, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 320 (1997) (stating
that courts have been adverse to approve affirmative action because it requires differential
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antidiscrimination statute, Title VII does not recognize or address the needs
of parents or children. Therefore, neither the FMLA nor Title VII provides
leave for the numerous routine childcare obligations for which parents are
most likely to need time off from work. These obligations may include
caring for a child with a common childhood illness such as a cold or the
flu, attending appointments with teachers and principals or dealing with
school closings, and last-minute babysitter cancellations.
One potential model for addressing the needs of working parents which
has attracted little scholarly attention is section 701(j) of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act,13 which mandates religious accommodation in the
workplace.14 Specifically, section 701(j) uses a balancing approach and
states that an employer must “reasonably accommodate” an employee’s
religious needs in the workplace when such accommodation can be made
without “undue hardship” to the business of the employer.15
Section 701(j) of Title VII is an appropriate model to address the issue of
parental accommodation in the workplace because it explicitly recognizes
that formal equality failed to adequately protect religious employees who at
times needed affirmative accommodation of their religious beliefs and
practices.16 Similarly, formal equality has failed to protect working parents
who, in many cases, need flexible work policies to balance their work and
parenting responsibilities.17
The balancing approach of section 701(j) is also appropriate because it
recognizes the needs of both the employer and the employee and mandates
accommodation only in cases where the employer will not suffer undue
hardship.18 While there will clearly be instances where accommodation of
treatment of employees); see, e.g., Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547,
1567 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that Title VII prohibits an employer from instituting a nonremedial affirmative action program that uses race as the deciding factor in an effort to
promote diversity).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
14. The author is aware of only one article that has seriously analyzed how § 701(j)
could be used as a model to develop legislation mandating parental accommodation in the
workplace. See generally Smith, supra note 3. Professor Smith’s article focuses in large
part on developing a definition of “compelling parental obligation” based on the
unemployment compensation case law as well as on developing an alternative definition of
“undue hardship.” See id. at 1467-73, 1479-86.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
16. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1460 (arguing that reasonable accommodation laws,
such as § 701(j), respond to the fact that in certain situations the imposition of formal
equality will actually lead to discriminatory treatment); see also Steven D. Jamar,
Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title VII and Religious
Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 742 (1996) (recognizing § 701(j) as “the first legal
recognition that religion-based cases needed to be treated differently from other cases”).
17. See infra Part III.B (discussing how Title VII has failed to adequately protect
working parents); see also Smith, supra note 3, at 1456 (suggesting that Title VII cannot
currently remedy the work-family conflict since it is based on a formal equality model).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (“The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable
to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious
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working parents may be difficult or costly for employers,19 there are also
numerous situations where working parents can be accommodated in the
workplace with minimal or no cost to employers. For example, economic
studies indicate that accommodation of working parents may actually save
employers money in the long run when one considers the costs associated
with high employee turnover rates, absenteeism, and lost productivity.20
This Article examines how to best develop a statute mandating parental
accommodation in the workplace based on section 701(j) and considers the
potential problems associated with this approach.
Part I of this Article addresses the demographic changes, which have
caused the work-family conflict to be a significant problem in the United
States. Part II discusses the harm caused when employers fail to
accommodate working parents, specifically addressing the harm to women,
men, children, society, and employers. In doing so, Part II illustrates why
lack of accommodation is a serious problem that needs to be addressed.
Part III discusses the failure of federal legislation—specifically the FMLA
and Title VII—to adequately forbid discrimination against and mandate
accommodation of working parents. Part IV examines how to best develop
an accommodation model based upon section 701(j) of Title VII. This
Part, which is the primary focus of the Article, provides an in-depth
analysis of the issues raised by the section 701(j) case law and discusses
how these issues would likely present themselves in the context of parental
accommodation.
I.

CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT

The difficulty faced by working parents in balancing their work and
family responsibilities has been caused in large part by the failure of the
American workplace to keep pace with the changing demographics of
American society. The majority of families today are no longer traditional
patriarchal families with a full-time stay-at-home mother and a father who
works out of the house. Rather, most employees are either part of a dualearner family (where both spouses work) or the head of a single parent
family. In the last few decades there has been a huge increase in the
number of women who have entered the workplace.21 Between 1969 and
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”);
see also infra Parts IV.B-C (analyzing how the balancing approach of § 701(j) should be
applied in cases of parental accommodation).
19. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the appropriateness of § 701(j) as a model and
providing examples of instances where employers may face undue hardship in granting
leave to employees with work-family conflicts).
20. See Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 88-89.
21. For additional discussion on how women entered the workforce see HEYMANN,
supra note 1, at 2-6 (discussing the labor revolution from home and agriculture-based work
to a paid industrial labor force that now includes women).
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1998, participation in the labor force by married women nearly doubled,
and participation by married women with children under the age of three
increased nearly threefold.22 By 2000, sixty-four percent of married
couples with children under the age of eighteen had both parents working
outside the home,23 and in 2002, seventy-two percent of mothers with
children age one and older were in the labor force.24
Yet despite these demographic changes, today’s workplace remains
structured around the “ideal worker”25—an employee who has no childcare
responsibilities, is able to “work at least forty hours a week year round,”
and work overtime on short notice.26 This “ideal worker” norm is based on
the traditional life patterns of men,27 i.e., a traditional patriarchal family
with a working father and full-time stay-at-home wife to care for their
children. One legal commentator explains that “[m]arket work continues to
be framed around the assumption that ideal workers have access to a flow
of family work that few mothers enjoy.”28
In addition to these demographic changes, over the last few decades the
number of hours that American employees work has increased while the
number of vacation days and other days that employees take off has
decreased.29 Furthermore, studies indicate that American employees now
work longer hours than employees in most other industrialized nations.30
Americans work longer hours than Europeans, with American men
working an average of forty-five hours a week and American woman
22. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 374 (attributing the increase in women’s employment
in part to Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes).
23. Smith, supra note 3, at 1448.
24. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, Percentage of Childless Women 40-44
Years Old Increases Since 1976, Census Bureau Reports (Oct. 23, 2003), at
http:/www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/fertility/001491.html (on file
with the American University Law Review). In recent years, the labor force participation
rate of mothers with children under the age of one has slightly decreased. From 1998 to
2002, this rate declined from fifty-nine percent to fifty-five percent. Id. Workplace experts
attribute this decrease, in part, to inflexible work schedules, which cause some working
mothers of infants to quit their jobs. See Armour, supra note 3.
25. Cf. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 2.
26. Id.
27. Cf. id. at 2 (arguing that the focus on the male life pattern negatively affects women
of childbearing age).
28. Id. at 3.
29. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 6-7 (observing that, while
more working mothers were entering the workforce, working fathers were adding more
hours as well, leading them to work nearly as much as childless men). But see Jerry A.
Jacobs & Kathleen Gerson, Toward a Family-Friendly, Gender Equitable Work Week, 1 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 457, 458-60 (1998) (arguing that the number of hours worked by the
average American employee has not increased, but rather, the percentage of employees
working either long or short weeks has increased and the number of hours worked by the
average American couple has increased as well).
30. See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1956-57 (2000) (arguing
that the United States government should consider enacting legislation that would reduce the
standard full-time work week for all employees).
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working approximately forty hours a week.31 Moreover, the overtime
hours worked by American employees are now higher than those worked in
Japan.32
The failure of the American workplace to keep pace with the changing
demographics of the country, coupled with the long hours worked by many
American employees, has led to significant difficulties for working parents
attempting to juggle their jobs and childcare responsibilities.33 It is
therefore not surprising that the majority of Americans supports change,
and specifically supports government policies that would help working
parents.34 For example, ninety percent of parents favor tax-incentives to
encourage employers to adopt family-friendly policies.35 Clearly, the
struggle to balance family and work is an issue that greatly matters to many
Americans.
The conflict between work and family is not unique to the United States
and exists in other industrialized nations as well.36 What is unique to the
United States is the government’s failure to meaningfully address this
issue.37 Over the last few decades, the United States has relied almost
exclusively on businesses voluntarily addressing the work-family conflict.38
Unfortunately this experiment has not succeeded, and the failure of the
American workplace to meaningfully accommodate working parents has
caused harm to individuals, employers, and society.
31. Id. at 1957. A number of European nations have reduced the standard workweek,
and commentators have suggested that the standard American workweek should be
shortened as well. See, e.g., Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 29, at 468 (advocating for a
thirty-five hour work week in response to the fact that most workers today are either heads
of single parent households or are members of a dual earner family); Schultz, supra note 30,
at 1957-58 (noting legislation in various European countries that sets mandatory limits on
the length of the workweek and providing examples of emerging attempts to do the same by
state governments, unions, and employers in the United States). But see Mark Landler,
Europe Reluctantly Deciding It Has Less Time for Time Off, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2004, at A1
(describing that Europeans are also now working longer hours than they have in the past).
32. Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work,
Gender as Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1490 (2001) [hereinafter Williams,
Difference].
33. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (arguing that the U.S. workplace, for the
most part, has failed to provide flexible schedules to working parents).
34. HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 164 (noting that such support is widespread among
Republicans, Democrats, and Independents).
35. See id. (discussing that seventy-nine percent of parents think that employees should
be able to request time off instead of overtime pay and seventy-one percent would like to
see workers receive up to two weeks of unpaid leave per year in addition to vacation time).
36. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 30, at 1957 (recognizing the efforts of France and
Germany to shorten the work week).
37. See, e.g., Paolo Wright-Carozza, Organic Goods: Legal Understandings of Work,
Parenthood and Gender Equality in Comparative Perspective, 81 CAL. L. REV. 531, 532-33
(1993) (suggesting that American employment law, in contrast to the law of most European
nations, neglects to consider social relationships and responsibilities, and the needs of
children).
38. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 167 (“We are the only industrialized country
to engage in an experiment that is almost entirely private-sector based.”).
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II. HARM CAUSED BY THE WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT
This Part discusses the harm caused by inflexible workplace policies and
the lack of meaningful accommodation of working parents. Specifically,
this Part addresses the ways in which the lack of meaningful workplace
accommodation negatively affects women, children, men, society, and even
employers. In doing so, this Part illustrates the significance of the problem,
and consequently why parental accommodation in the workplace is
necessary. This Part also responds to arguments made by critics
questioning whether, and the extent to which, society should have an
obligation to accommodate working parents.39
A. Harm to Women
Inflexible workplace policies are a significant problem for both men and
women with childcare responsibilities. However, lack of accommodation
is particularly problematic for mothers, since mothers are much more likely
than fathers to have primary responsibility for raising their children. The
need to balance work and family is an issue for the majority of women
since almost ninety percent of working women do become mothers.40
Many mothers make significant career sacrifices to take on their
childcare responsibilities. Specifically, women perform about eighty
percent of the childcare for their families and, as a result, over ninety
percent of mothers cannot do the type of overtime required by the best
jobs.41 This is a serious problem because the workplace remains structured
around “ideal workers” who can work long hours on short notice.42 While
there are many reasons as to why women have primary childcare
responsibilities, the workplace environment perpetuates the role of a
woman as the primary caregiver because companies are significantly more

39. See ELINOR BURKETT, THE BABY BOOM: HOW FAMILY-FRIENDLY AMERICA CHEATS
CHILDLESS 7-11, 18-22 (2000) (contending that America’s obsession with granting
perks to working parents has created a situation of wealth re-distribution from childless
workers, including those with few resources, to working parents, even if they are wealthy);
Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law and Desire, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 181-85 (2001) (arguing that feminist legal theorists focus on the importance
of motherhood to the point where they ignore women’s identity beyond their role as
mothers).
40. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 2. Books such as The Baby
Boon criticize women’s rights groups for focusing on issues affecting working mothers
since not all women are mothers. See BURKETT, supra note 39, at 7-8 (arguing that “family
friendly” legislation has ignored the thirteen million childless adults over forty in America).
While it is certainly true that not all women are mothers, the vast majority of women are
mothers and issues affecting working mothers are therefore important for the majority of
women.
41. See Williams, Difference, supra note 32, at 1471.
42. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (describing the “ideal worker” as
based on the traditional life patterns of men).
THE
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likely to provide maternity leave than paternity leave.43
Additionally, motherhood has a strong negative effect on a woman’s
income.44 Despite the fact that the pay differential between men and
women has decreased, the salary gap for mothers has increased.45 Studies
indicate that this pay gap is strongly associated with differing family
responsibilities and is not due to differences in education or work
experience.46 When adjustments for education are taken into consideration,
the gender-based earning gap between mothers and fathers is larger than
the earnings gap between blacks and whites.47 In addition, the workplace
remains very segregated by gender, and women are underrepresented in
jobs with higher pay and status.48
Mothers are also disadvantaged by stereotypes regarding working
mothers, and their careers are likely to be harmed when they hit the
“maternal wall,”49 which generally occurs when a woman gets pregnant,
becomes a mother, or asks for a flexible or part time work schedule.
Studies indicate that once one of these three events occurs, a woman is
more likely be viewed as a “low-competence caregiver rather than as a
high-competence business woman.”50 The problems associated with the
maternal wall are compounded by the fact that women in the workplace are
often disadvantaged to begin with as a result of the “glass ceiling.”51
43. See, e.g., Angie K. Young, Assessing the Family and Medical Leave Act in Terms of
Gender Equality, Work/Family Balance, and the Needs of Children, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
113, 116-17 (1998) (offering the results of surveys which show that although fifty-two
percent of employers provided maternity leave, only thirty-seven percent provided paternity
leave).
44. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 2 (noting how full-time
working mothers earn sixty cents to the dollar earned by full-time working fathers); see also
Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy,
and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 15-16 (2000) (“[O]ne of the
most compelling problems facing society at the end of the Twentieth Century [is] the
increasing inequitable and unequal distribution of societal resources and the corresponding
poverty of women and children.”).
45. See Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
25, 33 (1998) (comparing 1978 statistics showing that women with children earned 62.5%
as much as men while women without kids earned 68.4% with 1994 statistics indicating that
mothers earned 73.4% as much as men while childless women earned 81.3%).
46. See HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 148.
47. Id.
48. Cf. id. at 149 (offering, for example, the fact that women hold a disproportionately
low share of high paying university teaching positions, yet account for seventy-six percent
of primary and secondary teachers who make far less).
49. See Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 77 (offering anecdotal
statements from women whose employers have limited their work responsibilities either due
to their plans to take maternity leave or after their return from maternity leave and
referencing studies which indicate that motherhood has played an increasing role in the
gender pay disparity).
50. Id. at 90.
51. See generally Christine Jolls, Is There a Glass Ceiling?, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1
(2002) (asserting that unlawful sex discrimination still occurs, and partly accounts for
women’s diminished status in the labor market); Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra
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The barriers that working mothers face have become institutionalized to
the point that they simply seem to be part of the definition of work and do
not appear to be what they are—artificial barriers.52 It is accepted that the
“ideal worker” is an employee who can work long hours, work overtime
with little notice, and does not need unexpected leave.53 Employers
generally accept the importance of “face time,” regardless of whether it
correlates to higher quality work.54 The privileges that non-mothers enjoy
in the workplace are simply taken for granted.55 However, there is often no
business justification for the way the workplace is structured today, and a
business argument can be made for accommodating working parents.56
It should be noted that there are numerous reasons why women work
and, consequently, the problem of balancing work and parenting
obligations is not going to disappear. Many women must work to support
their families because of decreases in real wages, increases in single parent
families, and unprecedented divorce rates.57 Like many men, many women
also get a sense of accomplishment and personal satisfaction from their
employment.58 Studies indicate that women who work for pay have better
physical and mental health.59 Paid employment is also crucial for mothers
because the only way for women to achieve true economic equality is by
increasing their access to private wealth, and this usually occurs through
meaningful employment opportunities.60 Legal commentators have focused
note 3, at 98-101 (concluding that mothers are particularly disadvantaged in the workplace
due to the interaction between the “maternal wall” and glass ceiling biases, such as “ingroup favoritism, status-linked assessment stereotypes, attributional bias, polarized
evaluations, and penalties for being too competent in traditionally masculine jobs”).
52. See Mary Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1495,
1527-28 (2001) (contending that jobs can be re-structured so as to accommodate working
parents and suggesting that the parenting burden should also be shared by men).
53. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (describing the “ideal worker” which
is based on the traditional life patterns of men).
54. See infra notes 102, 109 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 52, at 1528 (listing a number of privileges that workers
without children take for granted, including greater respect at work, more sleep at night, and
not having to worry about their children during the day). There is also, at times, a
generational conflict between younger and older women. See Williams, Canaries, supra
note 3, at 2228 (describing the situation in law firms where women of the baby boom
generation often resolved the work-family conflict by not having children or by having
children and continuing to work long inflexible hours).
56. See infra Part II.E (arguing that inflexible work conditions lead to higher attrition
and turn-over rates, and that employers may therefore harm themselves by refusing to
accommodate working parents).
57. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 383 (stating that one-third of all homes with children
under eighteen are single parent households and noting that most single mothers have to
work full-time jobs in order to stay out of poverty).
58. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 41 (discussing how
working women are generally not as depressed and have higher self-esteem than women
who do not work).
59. See id.; see also Schultz, supra note 30, at 1908-11 (describing how working
women generally benefit from filling multiple roles).
60. See Williams, Difference, supra note 32, at 1457 (“To achieve economic equality
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on the importance of paid work as the foundation of a stable democratic
order.61 It should be noted that some critics argue that the work-family
conflict faced by many working women is simply a matter of choice and
the flaws with this reasoning will be addressed in Part IV.62
B. Harm to Children
In addressing the need for parental accommodation in the workplace, it
is important to recognize the needs of children63 and these needs,
unfortunately, are often ignored.64 While there are two federal statutes—
the FMLA and Title VII—which offer some protection to working
parents,65 neither of these statutes adequately recognizes that workplace
accommodation is important to protect the rights of children.
Lack of parental accommodation in the workplace is connected to the
issue of childhood poverty. Because the financial security of children is
often connected with their mother’s financial situation, and inflexible work
conditions combined with child care responsibilities economically impair
women, children end up suffering economically as well.66 This problem is
particularly acute in households headed by single mothers. Because of a
divorce rate of approximately fifty percent and a high rate of out-ofwedlock births, approximately one-third of all children under eighteen are
raised in a single-parent household.67 Moreover, the majority of these
for women, we need to change not only women’s relationship to public wealth, we need to
change their relationship to private wealth as well. After all, most of the world’s assets are
held by private parties—men—who gain it through employment and the family economy.”).
In order to illustrate that greater access to public wealth may not create gender equality,
Professor Williams discusses how Sweden actually exhibits a more sexually segregated
economy than the United States despite its outstanding social subsidies for care work. Id.;
see also Malin, supra note 45, at 32 (explaining how the generosity of Sweden’s parental
leave policy has actually created a highly sexually segregated workforce since employers
now prefer to hire young men because they are less likely to take parental leave).
61. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 30, at 1928-30 (asserting that paid employment brings
together people of diverse groups, allows co-workers to develop respect for one another,
provides people with opportunities to set and reach goals, and gives people a chance to
contribute to something greater than themselves).
62. See infra Part IV.B.4.
63. See Young, supra note 43, at 132 (recommending that “parental-leave polic[ies]” be
structured “from a family or child perspective, rather than from an adult perspective” so as
to “provide support to ensure that children’s caretakers have structures within which to
nurture their families”).
64. Cf. Wright-Carozza, supra note 37, at 574-78 (discussing how Italian laws
protecting working parents, unlike U.S. laws, explicitly recognize the importance of
children).
65. See infra Part III (highlighting the protections and limitations of the FMLA and
Title VII).
66. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 44, at 20 (“There are forgone opportunity costs
associated with care taking, and even caretakers who work in the paid labor force typically
have more tenuous ties to the public spheres because they must also accommodate
caregiving demands in private.”).
67. Kessler, supra note 3, at 383-84.
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households are headed by women.68 Even children in two-parent
households suffer economically when a parent leaves the workplace.69
Children of working parents who are able to keep their jobs, despite their
childcare responsibilities, also suffer as a result of the inflexible American
workplace. Parental involvement, for example, is one of the most
important factors determining how a child performs in school.70 Because
working parents are often unable to take time off from work to attend
meetings with teachers, principals, and other school officials,71 or to stay at
home with their children when they are sick,72 the needs of children are
further undermined by the American work system. Long parental
workdays with inadequate time to care for children have also been linked to
a number of serious childhood problems including psychiatric illness, drug
use, and involvement in crime.73 These problems are even more pressing
for poor children whose parents tend to have less flexibility in their work
schedules and fewer resources available to help them with childcare.
Furthermore, it is important for children to spend time with their fathers, as
well as their mothers, because studies indicate that paternal involvement
has a positive effect on every stage of childhood development.74
Clearly, employers need employees who are reliable and able to perform
their jobs, and there will be times that working parents will be unable to
spend as much time with their children as they would like. However,
federal law today is tipped almost fully in favor of the employer and does
not adequately protect the needs of children or even recognize the
importance of workplace accommodation to children.
C. Harm to Men
While the majority of employees requesting accommodation of their

68. See id. at 384 n.51 (revealing that the poverty rate for female headed households is
higher than that of two-parent households).
69. See id. at 383 (noting that in many two-parent households both parents must work
because real wages have decreased over the past few decades).
70. See HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 53 (explaining the correlation between parental
involvement and a child’s understanding of language and mathematics as well as progress in
other developmental areas).
71. See id. (revealing that many parents are not provided with sufficient paid leave to
take time off work to address these problems).
72. See id. at 162.
73. See HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 10 (addressing studies that show
a greater frequency of developmental problems in young people today compared with those
of the previous generation). Admittedly, the exact link between these problems and the
amount of time parents spend with children is unclear. Id. Regardless, children want more
time to spend with their parents, and parents want more time to spend with their children.
Id. at 11.
74. See, e.g., Malin, supra note 45, at 28-31 (describing a study conducted by the U.S.
Department of Education that shows a positive correlation between paternal involvement
and academic performance).
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parenting responsibilities are mothers, lack of accommodation in the
workplace is also a serious problem for fathers who want to be involved in
the lives of their children.75 Studies indicate that the stereotype that men
get most of their satisfaction and self-worth from their careers and not from
their families is inaccurate, and that many fathers want to better balance
work and parenting responsibilities.76 In fact, fathers who are not actively
involved with their children may end up paying an emotional cost.77
Paternal involvement is also positively correlated with a child’s
development and with a mother’s mental health and career success.78
Moreover, fathers who participate in the “second shift” of home life tend to
have happier marriages.79
Fathers are less likely than mothers to ask for parental accommodation in
the workplace, both for financial reasons and because of workplace
hostility to such requests. Parental leave is almost always unpaid, and in
two-parent households where both spouses work outside the home, the
father is usually the higher paid employee.80 It therefore makes economic
sense for the mother to be the one to readjust her schedule. A mother is
also significantly more likely than a father to have paid leave to care for an
infant.81
While both mothers and fathers may encounter workplace hostility when
asking for an accommodation of their parental responsibilities, the hostility
faced by men is greater. In one study, sixty-three percent of employers
stated that it was unreasonable for a father to take any parental leave.82
Fathers who ask for parental accommodation are viewed more negatively
than mothers asking for similar accommodations.83 In fact, a father who
asks for time off for his parenting responsibilities not only is considered a
less serious employee but also is viewed as a less competent father since
society tends to link being a good father with being a good provider.84
75. See generally Malin, supra note 45 (analyzing the importance of paternal leave);
Keith Cunningham, Note, Father Time: Flexible Work Arrangements and the Law Firm’s
Failure of the Family, 53 STAN. L. REV. 967 (2001) (discussing the impact of law firm
policy and culture on employees who are fathers).
76. See Malin, supra note 45, at 33-36 (highlighting studies that showed a desire by
both mothers and fathers to better balance their career and family responsibilities).
77. See HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT, supra note 3, at 262 (noting the desire of
most contemporary working fathers to spend time with their families).
78. See Malin, supra note 45, at 28-33 (asserting that the lack of paternal involvement
in childcare encumbers women’s success in the workplace).
79. See id. at 55 (recognizing the benefits received by mothers, children, and fathers
when fathers are involved in childcare).
80. Id. at 37-38.
81. See Cunningham, supra note 75, at 976 (noting that, while fifty-three percent of
surveyed companies offered paid maternity leave, only thirteen percent of the businesses
offered any paid paternity leave).
82. Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 101-02.
83. See id.
84. Id.
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D. Harm to Society
Democratic theorists have long recognized a strong connection between
the health of a democracy and how its children are raised because children
are the future citizens of the democracy.85 All Americans, and not just a
child’s parents, have a vested interest in ensuring that today’s children
grow up to be productive and responsible adults. Accommodating parents
in the workplace so that working parents are able to better balance their
work and parenting responsibilities is an effective way of addressing this
issue.86
Society as a whole benefits from the work of parents and others who
raise children. As economists assert,
The time, money, and care that parents devote to the development of
children’s capabilities create an important public good whose benefits
are enjoyed by individuals and institutions who pay, at best, a small
share of the cost. Economists define a public good as one that is difficult
to put a price on because it is nonexcludable (someone can enjoy it
without paying for it) and nonrival (one person can enjoy it without
diminishing someone else’s enjoyment of it.)87

Today’s children will become the future taxpayers, teachers, doctors,
lawyers, politicians and caregivers as well as future presidents of the
United States.88 Society is only able to reproduce itself and continue to
exist as a result of caregivers who are raising the next generation of
citizens.89
When parents do not have adequate time to spend with their children, it
is not only their children, but also society as a whole, that is harmed. For
example, working parents often lack adequate time to be involved in their
85. See, e.g., Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Who Should Pay for the Kids?, 563
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 194, 195 (1999) (describing how children are a public
good).
86. See infra Part IV.A (examining how developing a statute mandating parental
accommodation in the workplace based on § 701(j)’s requirement of religious
accommodation in the workplace may provide more meaningful protection to working
parents).
87. England & Folbre, supra note 85, at 195.
88. See Fineman, supra note 44, at 19 (“Caretaking labor provides the citizens, the
workers, the voters, the consumers, the students, and others who populate society and its
institutions. The uncompensated labor of caretakers is an unrecognized subsidy, not only to
the individuals who directly receive it, but more significantly, to the entire society.”).
89. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403,
1410 (2001) (emphasizing the collective responsibility of caretaking because of its
importance to society). Professor Franke responds to what she refers to as the “we must
reproduce the species” argument by suggesting that a change in immigration policies could
provide all the workers our country needs. Franke, supra note 39, at 193. However, there
are numerous reasons why parents have children, and a change in immigration policy
certainly will not affect the very personal decision of whether to have children. See Becker,
supra note 52, at 1524, 1533-35 (criticizing Franke’s proposal and arguing that women will
not decide whether to have children based on a shift in immigration policies).
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children’s education, which harms children academically.90 This harm is
problematic because the United States is failing to compete internationally
in primary and secondary education, and studies indicate that the success of
a country in the global economy depends in part on its citizens’ educational
attainment.91
Yet despite the importance of caring for children, and the fact that all of
society benefits from this work, caregiving is undervalued in the United
States, and the costs of raising children are paid primarily by their parents,
which is unfair in today’s economy.92 A century ago, parents bore much of
the cost of raising children but also received much of the economic benefit
of their children who labored from a young age to help support the family
and later supported their parents in old age.93 By contrast, when today’s
children grow up they will be providing financial assistance to many
families other than their own through taxes such as Social Security and
Medicare.94
In addition to benefiting from the caregiving work of those who raise
children, society also suffers economically when parents are forced out of
the workplace as a result of their childcare responsibilities. For example,
taxpayers as well as employers pay the cost in the form of unemployment
compensation, welfare, and Supplemental Security Income.95 In addition,
if parents cannot work outside the house, society will lose the taxes that
would otherwise be paid on employment income.
Critics respond to the position that raising children is important for
society by arguing that parents do not necessarily have their children for
society-sustaining purposes. For example, in her recent book, The Baby
Boom, Elinor Burkett approvingly quotes a critic who states, “Sure, all
those folks became parents because they were sitting around one night,
worrying about the future of the nation and decided, ‘we better go upstairs
90. See HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 53 (describing the correlation between parental
involvement in the education of children with academic achievement and lower dropout
rates).
91. See id. at 184 (acknowledging the view of policymakers that the welfare of nations
largely depends on the education of its citizens).
92. Cf. Fineman, supra note 89, at 1407.
93. See HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 170 (noting how children worked from an early age
on farms and in homes to benefit their families).
94. See id. (explaining that while the benefits of having children are enjoyed by the
public, the costs of caring for children are still shouldered by the parents); see also Becker,
supra note 52, at 1531-32 (explaining that children benefit the whole country by becoming
taxpayers and filling general service jobs).
95. Young, supra note 43, at 158. Professor Malin has examined the extent to which
unemployment insurance is available to employees who were forced out of employment as a
result of childcare responsibilities and has determined that “[p]ublic and private workplace
values are evolving to recognize that employees’ family obligations may curb employer
autonomy in directing the workforce.” Martin H. Malin, Unemployment Compensation in a
Time of Increasing Work-Family Conflicts, 29 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 131, 174 (1996).
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and do something about it.’”96 In a Columbia Law Review Essay,
Professor Franke questions the validity of feminists in describing children
as a “public good [since] children remain the private property of their
parents, which is an arrangement most feminists do not find troubling.”97
These types of arguments fail, however, because they confuse the issues of
why people have children and how they raise their children with the fact
that economically, these children are a public good.98
Professor Franke also fails to recognize the extent to which society does
have some control over the manner in which children are raised. While it is
true that there are fundamentally private aspects of childrearing which
society does not want the government to be involved in, the government
through child welfare laws regulates many aspects of childrearing.99 In
fact, working parents may find themselves facing legal difficulties when
they must leave their children unattended or with inadequate care in order
to go to work to support their families.100 For many working parents, the
choice is literally between physically being with their children and having
money to feed and clothe their children.
There is no question that the primary responsibility for raising children
rests with parents, and that childrearing involves financial and personal
sacrifices from parents.101 No legislation in the United States will change
this fact and no person should have children unless he or she is willing to
devote both time and money to raising them. However, society as a whole
96. BURKETT, supra note 39, at 196 (quoting Ilene Bilenky, a childfree-woman).
97. Franke, supra note 39, at 191. In reaction to a group of parents home-schooling
their children, she argues that “we have delegated to private parties the task of producing
and raising the next generation, and we have done so in the absence of any public
accountability.” Id. at 192.
98. Becker, supra note 52, at 1533 (explaining why children are a public good).
99. See, e.g., Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (2004)
(amending the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, the Adoption Opportunities Act,
the Abandoned Infants Assistance Act, and the Family Violence Prevention and Services
Act); Promoting Safe and Stable Families Amendments of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 629 (2002)
(amending the Promoting Safe and Stable Families program and Foster Care Independent
Living program). Of course there are many problems with these laws, which are evidenced
by cases of child abuse and the high rate of childhood poverty. For example, in 2002, the
rate of child abuse and neglect fatalities reported by the National Child Abuse and Neglect
Data Systems (NCANDS) rose from 1.84 per 100,000 children in 2000 to 1.96. National
Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, Child Abuse and Neglect
Fatalities:
Statistics
and
Interventions,
at
http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/factsheets/fatality.pdf (on file with the American University
Law Review).
100. One commentator writes of a school social worker who left her children home alone
for about ten minutes after school before she got home from work. While left alone, the
children started roughhousing and one was hurt and taken to the hospital. When the doctor
discovered the children had been left home alone he had the mother investigated.
HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 46-47.
101. See id. at 166 (“Employed caregivers themselves can do a lot, and their involvement
is critical; but they can play the role they need to only when they have the necessary
working conditions and social supports.”).
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both benefits from the caregiving work of those who raise children and is
greatly affected by how those children are raised. Therefore, society has an
obligation to caregivers and an interest in ensuring that parents are
accommodated in the workplace so that they are able to meet their
parenting obligations.
E. Harm to Employers
Employers may also harm themselves by refusing to accommodate
working parents. For example, many employers measure worker quality by
“face time” even when no clear correlation between hours at the job and
productivity exists.102 This focus on “face time” discriminates against
employees with childcare responsibilities and ignores the fact that
employers may actually improve their bottom line when they accommodate
working parents.
Economic studies indicate that once long-term costs are taken into
consideration, Flexible Work Arrangements (FWAs) may save employers
money by decreasing costs associated with “attrition, absenteeism,
recruiting, quality control, and productivity.”103 FWAs have been shown to
be cost-effective when offered to high-level professional employees as well
as to clerical staff and make business sense in both large and small
corporations.104 Employees who have their caregiving needs
accommodated are likely to work harder in appreciation of the
accommodation and to stay with the employer on a more long-term
basis.105 Studies indicate that women who work for family-friendly
companies take fewer sick days, work on their own more, and are more
likely to return to work after giving birth.106 Similarly, it may be
economically advantageous for employers to hire part-time employees
since part-time employees may be more efficient than full-time
employees.107
By failing to accommodate working parents, employers are also limiting
their pool of potential employees, and particularly employees with certain
102. See id. at 174 (noting that many employers regard work attendance as one of the
most important factors in judging the performance of an employee).
103. Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 88. But see generally ArnowRichman, supra note 3 (arguing that employers today are not likely to view employment
relationships as long-term, and therefore, have less of an incentive to invest in employees).
104. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 86-88.
105. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 3, at 382 (recognizing the benefits enjoyed by
employers from the increased employee loyalty that results from instituting FWAs).
106. See HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 31 (finding that workers who
took advantage of FWAs performed better than most of their counterparts).
107. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 3, at 382 (describing how employers benefit by
hiring part time employees); see also Cameron Stracher, All Aboard the Mommy Track, 21
AM. LAW. 2 (1999) (suggesting that part-time employment for lawyers may be financially
advantageous to employers).
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qualities and skills. This will become an increasing problem as the pool of
potential employees decreases with the retiring of the baby boom
generation. Furthermore, there is growing recognition that the skills that
one learns as a parent, such as increased empathy, efficiency, patience, and
the ability to multitask, can be transferred to the workplace.108 In other
words, parenting itself can help develop skills that many employers desire.
Clearly, there are instances where it will be difficult or costly for
employers to accommodate working parents. However, there are also
many cases where employers could save money and improve their bottom
line by permitting FWAs and focusing on the quality, quantity, and
timeliness of their employee’s work instead of on face time.109
Lack of meaningful accommodation of working parents is clearly
harmful to mothers, children, fathers, society, and employers. Yet despite
the harm caused by inadequate workplace accommodation, federal law has
failed to adequately forbid discrimination against and mandate
accommodation of working parents. The failure of federal law to
adequately address the needs of working parents will be discussed in the
next Part.
III. CURRENT LEGISLATION THAT PROTECTS WORKING PARENTS
The FMLA110 and Title VII111 are two federal statutes that protect
working parents. The protection offered by both of these statutes is limited
by the fact that neither addresses the ongoing needs of working parents.
While the stated purpose of the FMLA is to “balance the demands of the
workplace with the needs of families,”112 the statute in fact is premised on a
“medical model” and essentially permits a covered employee only a limited
amount of unpaid leave to care for her own or her family’s medical needs.
Title VII, an anti-discrimination statute, is premised on the concept of
formal equality, and as an antidiscrimination statute does not recognize or
address the needs of parents or children. This Part highlights both the
protection offered by FMLA and Title VII as well as the limitations of
these statutes.113
108. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Parenting Can Create Better Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 2004, § 10, at 1 (addressing the overlapping skills required by both parents and
managers); see also Robin Wilson, How Babies Alter Careers for Academics, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 15, 2003 (explaining how academia suffers by its refusal to
accommodate mothers).
109. See HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 174-78 (emphasizing how face time is at best an
imprecise measure of an employee’s attitude towards work).
110. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1).
113. This Article focuses on the limited protection that working parents receive under the
FMLA and Title VII’s prohibition of disparate treatment discrimination and disparate
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A. The Family and Medical Leave Act
114

The FMLA, which is the first federal statute to address the issue of
parental leave,115 was enacted by Congress in 1993 and provides leave for
both men and women. The Act’s preamble emphasizes the importance of
parenting, noting that “it is important for the development of children and
the family unit that fathers and mothers be able to participate in early
childrearing.”116 Lack of accommodation of working parents “can force
individuals to choose between job security and parenting.”117
Unfortunately, the actual protection provided by the FMLA falls far short
of the interests discussed in the preamble.118
With regard to parenting, the FMLA permits a limited number of
“eligible employees” to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year
after the birth or adoption of a child,119 or to care for a child with a “serious
health condition.”120 The FMLA applies only to employers with fifty or
more employees,121 which limits the number of covered employers. The
number of employees covered by the FMLA is further limited by the fact
that employees must have been employed by the covered employer for at
least twelve months prior to taking leave and must have worked at least
1,250 hours,122 or about twenty-five hours a week, during the preceding
year. This provision has a discriminatory impact on women, “since women
are more likely than men to work for small businesses, to work part-time,
to work in occupations with little job security, and to interrupt their careers
impact discrimination. However, there are a number of other legal theories that plaintiffs in
parental discrimination cases have occasionally relied on with some success. These theories
include constructive discharge and retaliation claims under Title VII, Equal Pay Act claims,
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims, equal protection and due process claims,
and claims under state statutes and state common law. Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall,
supra note 3, at 78-79.
114. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
115. See generally Young, supra note 43.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(3).
118. See Maxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Parenting Policies and Liberal
Theory, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 148-50 (1998) (concluding that the FMLA fails to protect a
broader concept of parenting); see also Kessler, supra note 3, at 419-30 (discussing the
limitations of the FMLA); Malin, supra note 45, at 50-55 (describing how the FMLA has
failed to adequately protect working fathers); Young, supra note 43, at 138-53 (arguing that
the FMLA does not promote equal career opportunities for women or adequately provide for
children’s needs).
119. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2)(A), 2612(a)(1)(A)-(B).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). The Act also permits an employee to take up to twelve
weeks of unpaid leave per year to deal with his or her own serious health condition or the
serious health condition of a spouse or parent. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C)-(D). This Article
focuses on the provisions of the Act specifically related to parental leave.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(a)(i)-(ii). See Dowd, supra note 10, at 238 n.84 (explaining
that while approximately two-thirds of employees work for covered employers, only about
one-half of the workforce is eligible for leave due to the requirements regarding the number
of hours worked and time on the job).
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due to family responsibilities.”123 Furthermore, because a maximum of
twelve weeks is provided for both pregnancy and the care of a newborn
infant, a mother with a difficult pregnancy might use up most or all of her
leave before her child is even born.
The FMLA also does not mandate wage replacement, but only requires
employers to provide unpaid leave.124 As a result, many employees entitled
to leave under the FMLA simply cannot afford to take it.125 Most single
working parents, who are predominantly women and disproportionately
members of minority groups, cannot afford to take unpaid leave.126 Lowerincome employees often cannot afford to take leave.127 Similarly, in dualincome households where both incomes are necessary, parents cannot
afford to take unpaid leave.128 The unpaid leave provision also makes it
more likely that the women in dual-income families, who tend to have
lower salaries, will be the partner to take the leave.129
The Act also discriminates against highly compensated employees
because FMLA coverage does not extend to key employees.130 This
provision sends a clear message to financially successful men and women
that they may have to sacrifice their family as a price of their success.131
Because men tend to be higher paid than women and are more likely to be
“key employees,” this provision further decreases the likelihood that
fathers will take leave.132

123. Kessler, supra note 3, at 422.
124. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d).
125. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 422-23 (arguing that only the most privileged working
women can afford to take advantage of the FMLA’s protections because of the FMLA’s
unpaid leave provision); Young, supra note 43, at 140 (stating that because the leave is
unpaid, individuals and their families bear the financial burden of taking leave).
126. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 422 & n.287 (noting that single mothers are
disproportionately minorities and that over one-half of all black families with children under
eighteen are headed by single mothers).
127. See Dowd, supra note 10, at 238 n.84 (citing COMM’N ON LEAVE, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE
POLICIES 65, 168 (1995)).
128. See Young, supra note 43, at 141 (noting that most dual-income families require
both incomes and, thus, FMLA’s unpaid leave provision is insufficient for such families).
129. Id. (quoting Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Family: A Blueprint for
Family Leave, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 341 (1993)); see also Jolls, supra note 51, at 15
(arguing that sex discrimination prevents women from attaining more prestigious higher
paying positions).
130. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b) (2000); Young, supra note 43, at 144. The FMLA allows
an employer to deny job restoration to an employee if “such denial is necessary to prevent
substantial and grievous economic injury to the operations of the employer” and if the
employee “is among the highest paid 10 percent of the employees employed by the
employer within 75 miles of the facility at which the employee is employed.” 29 U.S.C. §§
2614(b)(1)(A), 2614(b)(2).
131. See Young, supra note 43, at 144.
132. Id. at 143; see also Malin, supra note 45, at 49-55 (commenting that the FMLA
provides only limited job restoration protection and that the absence of such protection
deters men, who tend to be the primary breadwinners, from taking leave).
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The most significant defect of the FMLA with regard to parental
accommodation is the fact that it is premised on the “medical model.”133
With the exception of permitting leave within the first year of a child’s
birth or for the adoption of a child, the FMLA only permits leave for a
parent to care for a child with a “serious health condition.”134 The Act’s
restrictive definition of “serious health condition” excludes the numerous
common childhood ailments, such as a cold, the flu, an ear infection, or a
stomachache, for which parents are most likely to require leave.135 The
FMLA also fails to provide parental leave for any non-medical reason.136
Specifically, parents are not entitled to leave under the FMLA for
appointments with teachers and principals, snow days, school vacation
days, other school closings, last minute baby-sitter cancellations, or any
other non-medical emergencies.137 The Act, therefore, does not provide
leave for the most common reasons—medical or non-medical—for which
parents need time off to care for their children.138
Legal commentators have made suggestions on how to improve the
FMLA and make it more parent friendly,139 and legislation has been
introduced that would expand the scope of the FMLA.140 While the author
133. See Eichner, supra note 118, at 149-50 (explaining that the FMLA does not
encompass a broader concept of care). In an article published the same year that the FMLA
was passed, one commentator who was critical of the American legal system’s focus on
“women’s disability, illness, and infirmity” as the primary rationale for parental leave,
expressed hope that the FMLA could nudge American law in a new direction. WrightCarozza, supra note 37, at 571.
134. A serious health condition is defined as “an illness, injury, impairment, or physical
or mental condition that involves—(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential
medical care facility; (B) or continuing treatment by a health care provider.” 29 U.S.C. §
2611(11)(A)-(B); see also Young, supra note 43, at 142-43 (discussing the definition of a
serious health condition under the FMLA). Serious health conditions include
Heart attacks, heart conditions requiring heart bypass or valve operations, most
cancers, back conditions requiring extensive therapy or surgical procedures,
strokes, severe respiratory conditions, spinal injuries, appendicitis, pneumonia,
emphysema, severe arthritis, severe nervous disorders, injuries caused by serious
accidents on or off the job, ongoing pregnancy, miscarriage, complications or
illness related to pregnancy, such as severe morning sickness, the need for prenatal
care, childbirth and recovery from childbirth.
Smith, supra note 3, at 1450 n.43 (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 29 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 31).
135. HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 24.
136. See, e.g., Eichner, supra note 118, at 150 (arguing that the Act “completely
disregards other needs, deeming medical needs the only ones worthy of legal protection”).
137. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 429; Smith, supra note 3, at 1446-47 (describing
routine childcare responsibilities that require short-term absences from work, but which are
not covered under the FMLA).
138. Id.
139. See generally Dowd, supra note 10, at 250-51 (recommending reforms to the
FMLA including universal paid leave); Young, supra note 43, at 153-60 (recommending
that the FMLA provide wage replacement funded by taxes, that the maximum leave period
be extended beyond twelve weeks, and that the number of covered employees be increased).
140. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 463 (discussing legislation that would expand covered
activities to include participation in a child’s school or extracurricular activities).
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supports many of these proposals, this Article focuses on expanding the
scope of parental rights in the workplace by developing an accommodation
model based on section 701(j) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
B. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
1.

Disparate treatment
Employees have had limited success in gaining parental accommodation
by relying on Title VII’s disparate treatment theory of discrimination,
which prohibits intentional discrimination based upon a protected category
such as sex.141 Courts have recognized that disparate treatment extends to
the prohibition of discrimination based on “sex plus” another neutral
characteristic, such as parental status. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp,142 a case involving parental discrimination, the United States
Supreme Court considered the applicability of the “sex plus” theory of
discrimination. The Martin Marietta Corporation refused to hire women
with pre-school aged children, despite the fact that it employed men with
pre-school aged children.143 The Court held that Martin Marietta violated
Title VII by intentionally treating women with young children differently
than it treated men with young children.144
The primary limitation of the disparate treatment analysis is that it
essentially mandates little more than formal equality in the workplace.
Employers cannot treat mothers differently than either fathers or childless
female employees based upon stereotypes or generalizations regarding
working mothers.145 Therefore, mothers who are capable of succeeding in
the workplace, which is currently structured around the life patterns of the
traditional man,146 may not be penalized based on their employer’s views of

141. See Chamallas, supra note 3, at 339 (hypothesizing that few “mother
discrimination” cases are brought because of the difficulty plaintiffs face in winning these
cases); Eichner, supra note 118, at 138-40 & n.18 (arguing that Title VII’s focus is too
limited because it ignores the needs of families and children); Kessler, supra note 3, at 40012 (discussing cases where Title VII has failed to give women workplace accommodation
for their caregiving responsibilities); Smith, supra note 3, at 1456-59 (arguing that because
disparate treatment focuses on intentional discrimination it fails to adequately resolve
conflicts between work and family).
142. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam). See generally Chamallas, supra note 3, at 33948 (detailing the history of Martin Marietta Corp.).
143. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. at 543.
144. Id. at 544.
145. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 339; Kessler, supra note 3, at 401-02 (discussing
successful outcomes for plaintiffs in cases involving hiring or promotion where an employer
bases a decision solely on stereotypes regarding a woman’s responsibilities to her children).
146. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (describing an American workplace
revolving around the schedule of a man with a stay-at-home wife who takes care of the
children).
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working mothers.147 However, the ban on disparate treatment provides
little help for working parents, particularly working mothers, who in fact
need some accommodation of their parenting obligations.148 Furthermore,
because the goal of Title VII is to eradicate discrimination, the statute
simply does not address the needs of children or the importance of
parenting.149
Disparate treatment claims are further limited by evidentiary burdens.150
In some cases, there is no similarly situated employee to whom the plaintiff
can be compared151 because the workforce today remains highly segregated
by gender.152 Plaintiffs are also most likely to be successful where they
have direct statements of bias against working mothers, but, in many cases,
this type of “smoking gun” evidence does not exist.153
However, in a recent article, Professors Williams and Segal argue that
Title VII’s prohibition on disparate treatment is not an empty remedy and

147. See, e.g., Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 22505, 1998 WL 912101, at **5-7
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998) (finding that the mother of two young children who was an
attorney established a prima facie case of discrimination when her employer passed her over
for promotion and instead offered the position to less qualified men with children and a
woman without children).
148. Kessler, supra note 3, at 402-12 (citing Martinez v. NBC, 49 F. Supp. 2d 305
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Chi v. Age Group, Ltd., No. 94 Civ. 5253, 1996 WL 627580 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 29, 1996); Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, 926 F. Supp. 653, 656 (M.D. Tenn.
1996); Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833, 1996 WL 374151 (S.D.N.Y. July 2,
1996)) (discussing cases where women have been unsuccessful in using Title VII to obtain
workplace accommodation for their caregiving responsibilities). But see Williams & Segal,
Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 103-06 (advocating the potential for success under Title VII
and characterizing the cases, including the ones cited immediately above, often used by
critics of Title VII as reflecting “weak facts and weak lawyering”).
149. See Eichner, supra note 118, at 139 (“The problem is not chiefly that
antidiscrimination law is failing to fulfill the function intended by Congress, but that its
function, by nature, is limited.”).
150. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 416 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 994 (1988)) (explaining that, while the Supreme Court requires that statistical
disparities be sufficiently substantial to raise the inference of causation, plaintiffs are
frequently unable to provide statistically significant evidence of disparate treatment because
of the lack of relevant comparisons).
151. See, e.g., Fuller, 926 F. Supp. at 657 (denying relief to an employee who failed to
make a prima facie claim of discrimination because she was replaced by another mother and
failed to show that she had been treated differently than a father would have been treated);
Bass, 1996 WL 374151, at *5 (dismissing plaintiff’s claim that she was denied promotion
because she was a married mother with two young children and concluding that plaintiff
offered no evidence to show employer “treated her differently than married men or men
with children”). But see Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107,
113, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2004) (permitting the case to proceed even though the plaintiff did not
establish that she was treated differently than a man would have been treated). See
generally Camel Sileo, Second Circuit Tears Down ‘Maternal Walls’, 40 TRIAL 95 (2004),
for a discussion of the groundbreaking nature of the Back case.
152. See, e.g., id.
153. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 353. But see Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra
note 3, at 95 (noting that “[t]hough hostile prescriptive stereotyping is rare in contexts
outside parenthood—most people know enough not to proclaim that ‘woman don’t belong
here’—some employers are not yet as savvy when it comes to family caregivers”).
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that scholars “have underestimated the potential for disparate treatment
suits.”154 They argue that the cases relied upon by scholars who
underestimate its utility involve “weak facts and weak lawyering”155 and
that there are a number of cases in which plaintiffs do succeed in disparate
treatment cases.156 They also point out that there are a number of disparate
treatment claims that have resulted in large monetary awards despite the
fact they did not produce legal decisions.157 Williams and Segal, however,
do agree that plaintiffs are generally most successful in cases in which the
adverse job action was “based on stereotypical views that motherhood
renders women less capable of and less suited for performing competitively
in the workplace than men and women without children.”158 Therefore,
while a caregiver may be successful in bringing a disparate treatment
lawsuit, this success is most likely in cases in which the caregiver is
arguing for little more than formal equality.159
2.

Disparate impact
The disparate impact theory of discrimination would seem to provide
more protection to working parents who are discriminated against on the
job as a result of their parenting obligations. Unlike disparate treatment,
disparate impact does not require intentional discrimination. Instead, it
focuses on equality of result and prohibits employers from engaging in
neutral policies that have a disproportionately negative effect on employees
who are members of a protected category.160
For a number of reasons, however, caregivers have had only limited
success relying on the disparate impact theory of discrimination.161 First,
154. Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 108.
155. Id. at 106.
156. See id. at 124-30 (identifying and describing cases where mothers successfully
challenged adverse job actions based on the disparate treatment analysis).
157. Id. at 130.
158. Id. at 125.
159. Professors Williams and Segal also explain that it is counterproductive for feminist
legal scholars to focus so much attention on the failures of Title VII, since this does not help
the attorneys who are actually litigating the caregiving cases. Rather, they believe that
attorneys can expand the scope of the law by litigating wisely, and that social change
regarding the rights of caregivers in the workplace can also be brought about by “rights
talk.” Id. at 110-22.
160. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 436 (1971) (holding that employer
could not use an employment test that disqualified African American applicants at
substantially higher rates than white applicants and was not shown to be related to job
performance).
161. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 287-89 (E.D.
Tex. 1996) (denying employer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s challenge to employer’s sick
leave policy, which limited leave to an employee’s own illness and had a disparate impact
on women who were more likely than men to take sick leave to care for others); United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647,
650-55 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying employer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s challenge to
employer’s leave policy, which had a disproportionately negative impact on female
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an employee must identify a “neutral” policy that disproportionately affects
the employment opportunities of members of a protected class.162 This is
difficult since many “neutral” policies that negatively affect employees
with parenting obligations, such as long hours, inflexible schedules, limited
leave, and the requirement of working overtime on short notice, are not
viewed as policies, but rather are viewed as the requirements of work
itself.163 Employees have therefore had only limited success in challenging
these “non policies.”164 While the disparate impact analysis may be used to
ensure that women are given equal opportunities within the currently
structured workplace, it has been less successful in challenging the very
structure of the workplace and the assumption that an ideal employee has
no caregiving responsibilities.165
Once an employee successfully identifies a neutral policy, the employee
must show that the challenged policy negatively affects women in
comparison to men.166 However, it is only possible to make this showing if
there are a statistically significant number of men who are similarly
situated to the plaintiff, which is often not the case since much of the
American workplace remains segregated by sex.167 Furthermore, men are
less likely to be primary caregivers and are therefore less likely to work
part-time, request parental leave, or use other flexible work
arrangements.168 This trend may make it difficult for an employee to show
that an employer has discriminated against women who use flexible work
arrangements because there may not be a comparison group of similarly-

employees).
162. Since women do the majority of childcare, the protected category is usually gender.
See Kessler, supra note 3, at 420 (noting the FMLA’s finding that women often have
primary caregiving responsibility).
163. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 413-14 (describing various “non policies” that fall
under the definition of “work” and are therefore virtually non-actionable under Title VII).
“While there are many identifiable, affirmative employer practices and policies that serve to
disadvantage women in the workplace, they are so entrenched, so accepted as the norm, that
they are virtually invisible.” Id. at 413.
164. For a discussion of the limitations of disparate impact analysis with regard to the
caregiving cases, see generally Kessler, supra note 3, at 412-19 (explaining that disparate
impact offers only limited protection to working mothers); Smith, supra note 3, at 1457-59
(discussing the limitations of disparate impact analysis in promoting work conditions that
address the work-family conflict); and Peggie Smith, Parental-Status Discrimination: A
Wrong in Need of a Right?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 581-85 (noting obstacles to
pleading a successful disparate impact case). But see Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall,
supra note 3, at 108-10 (arguing that, although commentators have underestimated their
potential, disparate impact suits can be successfully used to challenge job policies that
disproportionately impact women with caregiving responsibilities).
165. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 3, at 413; Smith, supra note 3, at 1458.
166. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 415-16 (acknowledging that there is no precise
formula to prove such disproportionate impact but that the “statistical disparities must be
sufficiently substantial”) (citations omitted).
167. Smith, supra note 164, at 583.
168. See generally Malin, supra note 45.
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situated men who have used such arrangements.169
Finally, even if an employee shows that a neutral policy has a disparate
impact on women, an employer can still use the “business necessity”
defense.170 However, the growing body of literature regarding the business
case for adopting family friendly workplace policies can be used by
plaintiffs to overcome the business necessity defense.171
Professors Williams and Segal argue that “disparate impact claims are
useful in addressing discrimination faced by mothers and other family
caregivers in the workplace,”172 and they cite a number of cases involving
leave policies that have an adverse impact on women or policies that
discriminate against employees with flexible work arrangements.173
However, the author is unaware of any cases where an employee has been
successful in claiming that long or inflexible work schedules have an
adverse impact on women, who are more likely than men to be
caregivers.174 Therefore, while the adverse impact theory of discrimination
can be useful in some cases, it is limited by its inability to challenge the
very structure of the workplace and by evidentiary burdens.
This Part has focused on the limited protection working parents receive
under both the Family and Medical Leave Act and Title VII. The next Part
examines how to provide more meaningful protection to working parents
by developing a statute mandating parental accommodation in the

169. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 3, at 416 n.249 (citing cases denying relief for
plaintiffs due to plaintiffs’ inability to produce evidence of a similarly situated group of men
as required to show disparate impact). But see United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm’n v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 650, 655 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(finding that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of sex discrimination under the
disparate impact theory of Title VII where fifty out of fifty-three employees who were
terminated under the employer’s policy, which did not allow first year employees to take
long-term sick leave, were women and where twenty of these women were pregnant).
170. For the business necessity defense to apply, the challenged practice must be “job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000). See also Kessler, supra note 3, at 416-17 (suggesting that the
defense is effective for employers because courts perceive “less employer culpability in a
disparate impact case”).
171. See, e.g., Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 88-89 & n.62 (arguing
that businesses have an economic interest in developing “family-responsive policies,” which
decrease “the costs associated with attrition, absenteeism, recruiting, quality control, and
productivity”).
172. Id. at 134.
173. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 287-89 (E.D.
Tex. 1996) (denying employer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s challenge to employer’s sick
leave policy, which limited leave to an employee’s own illness and which had a disparate
impact on women who were more likely than men to take sick leave to care for others);
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp.
647, 650-55 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying employer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s challenge to
employer’s leave policy, which had a disproportionately negative impact on female
employees).
174. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 415 (noting in 2001 that the author had not identified
any cases “challenging long or inflexible work hours under a disparate impact theory”).
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IV. DEVELOPING A STATUTE MANDATING PARENTAL ACCOMMODATION
IN THE WORKPLACE BASED ON SECTION 701(J)
This Part examines how best to develop a statue mandating parental
accommodation in the workplace based upon section 701(j) of Title VII,
which mandates religious accommodation in the workplace. This Part first
provides an overview of section 701(j) and discusses why section 701(j) is
an appropriate model to use in developing a statute mandating parental
accommodation in the workplace. This Part then turns to the primary
issues that the federal courts have faced in interpreting the terms
“reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship,” under section 701(j)
and discusses how these terms should be defined in a statute mandating
parental accommodation in the workplace.
A. Why the Balancing Approach of Section 701(j) is Appropriate
The accommodation model of section 701(j) is appropriate to use in
addressing the needs of working parents because it recognizes the
limitations of formal equality. Title VII was initially enacted to prohibit
discrimination against minority groups. As originally passed, Title VII
prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of religion but did not
affirmatively mandate accommodation of religious employees.175 In 1972
Congress amended Title VII by enacting section 701(j), which
affirmatively requires an employer to “reasonably accommodate” an
employee’s religious observance or practice unless the employer can
demonstrate that such accommodation would cause him “undue
hardship.”176
In enacting section 701(j), Congress specifically recognized that the
formal equality required under Title VII had not adequately protected
religious employees in the workplace.
The pre-1972 religious
accommodation case law had demonstrated that while employers could not
discriminate on the basis of religion, employers had no affirmative duty to
accommodate an employee’s religious needs.177 Employers could therefore
175. The Act provides that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
177. See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 1970)
(determining that failure to accommodate an employee’s religious observance should not be
equated with religious discrimination), aff’d mem. by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S.
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legally establish a standard work week for all their employees, regardless
of whether the effect of such a schedule would be to cause a conflict for
religious employees. Because the workplace, to a large extent, is structured
around the holidays of the Christian majority, it was members of minority
religious groups who most often needed their religious practices
accommodated.178
Similarly, formal equality has not provided adequate protection to
working parents. Just as the American workplace is structured around the
Christian majority, the American workplace today remains structured
around the life patterns of the traditional patriarchal man who has no
childcare responsibilities.179 As explained in Part I, this structure
essentially ignores the life patterns of mothers, who are primarily
responsible for childcare.180 Therefore, simply permitting women (as well
as men with childcare responsibilities) to enter the workplace as it is
currently structured will not provide true equality for working parents.
Many excellent employees with caregiving responsibilities are simply
unable to work the long inflexible hours required by many of the best
jobs.181 Just as section 701(j) recognized that formal equality did not
provide adequate protection to religious employees in the workplace, the
need for “reasonable accommodation” of working parents is premised upon
the fact that the law does not adequately protect working parents with
childcare responsibilities.182
Some legal commentators have criticized the accommodation approach
by arguing that it sends the message that parents, usually mothers, are
asking for special treatment.183 While this is a concern, the fact remains
689 (1971) (per curiam); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583, 590 (M.D. Fla. 1971)
(determining that an employer did not have an obligation to affirmatively accommodate an
employee who was a Sabbatarian), rev’d, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
178. Engel, supra note 12, at 388 n.302. Section 701(j) was introduced by Senator
Jennings Randolph with the express purpose of protecting Sabbatarians. 118 CONG. REC.
705 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
179. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (describing the “ideal worker”).
180. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (providing statistics showing that women
do the majority of childcare).
181. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that two-thirds of
mothers work fewer than forty hours per week and ninety-five percent of mothers work
fewer than fifty hours per week during the important career building years from ages
twenty-five to forty-four).
182. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1460-64 (setting out the merits of the accommodation
approach).
183. See, e.g., Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 88 (arguing that the
workplace is currently designed around the life patterns of men and what women need is not
accommodation, but rather equality, and a workplace that takes into account the
characteristics of women); see also Jolls, supra note 51, at 13 (arguing that women have
additional caregiving responsibilities, in part, because sex discrimination causes them to be
paid less, and that instead of focusing on the controversial idea of “restructuring the
workplace” to improve women’s financial position, focus should be placed on aggressively
enforcing antidiscrimination laws that would lead to increases in women’s salaries).
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that Title VII’s mandate of formal equality has failed to adequately protect
working parents, and additional protection is needed.
Furthermore, recent scholarship casts doubt on the sharp distinction
between prohibitions on discrimination and mandates of accommodation.184
For example, the appropriate remedy in disparate impact cases may be to
modify a practice as applied to a protected class, which essentially means
requiring differential treatment, or accommodation, of certain
employees.185 Scholarship on the work-family conflict has also minimized
the accommodation/ discrimination distinction.186 Professor Williams
supports litigation aimed at altering the way in which work is performed
since the workplace is currently structured around the life patterns of
traditional men without childcare responsibilities.187 In other words, an
employer’s failure to adopt workplace practices that recognize the life
patterns of caregivers constitutes a form of discrimination. Furthermore,
section 701(j) is drafted in a manner that minimizes the distinction between
accommodation and discrimination since failure to accommodate a
religious employee is viewed as a form of discrimination.188
Section 701(j) is also an appropriate model to use because it recognizes
and balances the needs of both employers and employees.189 The primary
goal of an employer is to run a profitable business. As a result, there will
be some limitations on the extent to which working parents can be
accommodated. However, current law mandates minimal accommodation
of working parents, regardless of the cost or inconvenience to employers.190
Employers are now free to ignore the fact that there are many cases in
which accommodation may well be cost-effective. As Professors Williams
and Segal explained in a recent article, a growing body of literature
questions the assumption that accommodation is costly. The literature
reasons that a restructured workplace that institutes family friendly policies
may save an employer money in the long run “by decreasing costs
associated with attrition, absenteeism, recruiting, quality control and

184. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 3, at 360 (discussing scholarship which argues that
“negative directives,” such as those in Title VII, and “affirmative requirements,” such as
those imposed by accommodation statutes, are not distinct but actually lie on a continuum).
185. See id. at 360-361 n. 52-54.
186. See id. at 361 (explaining that in her scholarship addressing the work-family
conflict, Professor Williams has collapsed the “equality/accommodation” distinction).
187. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 101 (explaining that the threat
of legal liability encourages social change, but cautioning that lawsuits are both financially
and emotionally costly).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
189. See id. (requiring reasonable accommodation of religious employees unless doing
so would result in “undue hardship” on the employer’s business).
190. See supra Part II.E (explaining that employers are often concerned with issues such
as face time and an employee’s ability to work long hours on short notice regardless of
whether these factors correlate with the quality of an employee’s work).
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productivity.”191 In other words, the American workplace is structured in a
manner that both discriminates against parents with childcare
responsibilities and in many cases does not even reflect true business
needs.
The author recognizes that every accommodation will not be appropriate
in every workplace, and that situations exist where a particular
accommodation would cause an employer to suffer “undue hardship.”
While a law professor can easily write an article or book from home in the
evening, other workplaces are not so adaptable. For example, hospitals,
schools, and restaurants must be staffed with doctors, teachers, and
waitresses during the hours that they are in operation. If one of these
employers has a large number of employees requesting parental
accommodation, the employer may not be able to accommodate all of
them. Courts interpreting section 701(j) have engaged in fact-specific
analysis to determine which accommodations are appropriate in the various
workplaces.192 Similarly, when disputes arise within the context of parental
accommodation, courts can be expected to work out which
accommodations are appropriate for different employers.
Section 701(j) is also an appropriate model because both religious
employees and working parents with childcare responsibilities have similar
accommodation needs—primarily the need for a flexible work schedule
that permits the employee to take time off. The majority of cases brought
under section 701(j) involve employees requesting time off for religious
observance. Similarly, the accommodation most commonly needed by
parents with childcare responsibilities is increased flexibility and time
off.193 Many of the accommodations suggested by the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Religion,194 including the use of flexible work
schedules, voluntary substitutes, and lateral transfers would also be an
appropriate means of accommodating working parents. This Part will
discuss other types of accommodations, such as permitting employees to
work part-time or to work from home, that are also appropriate means of
accommodating working parents.
191. Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 88.
192. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 66 (1986) (agreeing with
the Court of Appeals that the issue of reasonable accommodation cannot be resolved
without further fact-finding); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th
Cir. 1981) (“[T]he decision of whether a particular accommodation works an undue
hardship . . . must be made by considering the particular factual context of each case”)
(citations omitted).
193. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 28-30 (revealing results of interviews
suggesting that those with inflexible schedules and inability to take time off have the most
childcare problems).
194. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)i-iii (2004).

KAMINER.OFFTOPRINTER

2004]

8/9/2005 1:10:24 PM

THE WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT

335

Professors Williams and Segal argue that section 701(j) is not an
appropriate model for parental accommodation because
the wide variety of religious practices . . . means that it will often be
impossible to design a single norm to take into account all the diverse
needs for religious accommodation. In the work-family arena, there is
not a dazzling array but a dyad. The question is whether workplaces . . .
will be redesigned to take into account the reproductive biology and
social roles of women and family caregivers, as well.195

However, the specific accommodation needs of working parents may
differ as greatly from one another as the specific accommodation needs of
adherents of different religious faiths. Parents of school-age children may
want to go to work early so they can be home when their children return
from school, while parents of infants and toddlers may prefer having their
mornings at home and working during the afternoon. Children will get sick
on different days and working parents will schedule appointments with
teachers and principals on different days. The situations of both caregivers
and religious employees are similar in that they both require flexibility in
their work schedules. However, the specific accommodation needs of
working parents may differ as greatly from one another as the specific
needs of religious employees.196
Some legal scholars have questioned the effectiveness of a statute
mandating parental accommodation in the workplace based on section
701(j) due to their concern that it will be an empty remedy.197 Both
scholars who support using section 701(j) as a model for mandating
parental accommodation in the workplace and scholars who oppose this
model have accepted the view that courts have interpreted section 701(j) so
narrowly as to render it “virtually useless for most employees whose
religious practices conflict with work.”198 However, an exhaustive survey

195. Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 84-85.
196. One distinction between religious accommodation and parental accommodation is
that an employee can usually plan for religious needs (i.e. holidays, the Sabbath), while a
working parent does not always know in advance all of the days that she will need off (i.e.
sick days, snow days, unexpected school closings, etc.). However, parents have some
flexibility in scheduling school related appointments, while religious employees cannot
schedule religious holidays.
197. According to Professors Williams and Segal,
[A]dvocating a new statute along the lines of Title VII’s religious accommodation
provision poses a risk: why tell family caregivers to await the passage of a new
law in order to gain rights, and then advocate, as a model, a statute that will likely
be interpreted so narrowly as to provide little effective relief?
Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 84; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note
3, at 349 (arguing that the American legal system’s commitment to formal equality limits
the utility of mandated accommodation).
198. See Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 84 (quoting Smith, supra
note 3, at 1479).
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of the case law interpreting section 701(j) reveals a different outcome.199
While some courts have narrowly interpreted an employer’s obligation
under section 701(j), “[t]here are also courts that view an employee’s
request for religious accommodation as important and worthy of protection
and that require a more significant level of accommodation.”200 Therefore,
while section 701(j) would certainly be more effective if amended,201 the
author does not believe that it is an empty remedy.
To the extent that section 701(j) fails to adequately protect religious
employees in the workplace, a statute mandating parental accommodation
in the workplace can be drafted so that it is not open to an overly narrow
interpretation.202 In fact, Congress has recognized the need to strengthen
section 701(j). Specifically, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act,203
which would both broaden and clarify the scope of section 701(j), has been
introduced in numerous Congressional sessions.204 Furthermore, in
mandating religious accommodation in the workplace, courts have
expressed concern with violating the Establishment Clause,205 which is an
issue that does not arise in the context of parental accommodation in the
workplace. There are also a number of reasons why it may be easier for
employers to accommodate an employee’s bona fide parenting obligations
than an employee’s religious needs, which will be discussed in greater
detail in the next Subpart.
The enactment of a statute mandating parental accommodation in the
workplace would also raise the visibility and importance of this issue.
Section 701(j) is valuable not only because religious employees have the
ability to bring legal action,206 but also perhaps, more importantly, because
of the lawsuits that never arise. Employers understand that religious
discrimination is illegal and that employees have some right to religious
199. See generally Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and
Consistent Protection of Religious Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575 (2000) (illustrating the American legal system’s ambivalence towards
accommodation of religious employees in the workplace).
200. Id. at 579 (citing Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1987); OpukuBoateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1996)).
201. See id. at 628-31 (proposing amendments to § 701(j) that would serve to clarify and
broaden its scope).
202. It might be difficult to generate sufficient congressional support to enact a statute
mandating parental accommodation in the workplace. However, this is a different issue
than the argument that any statute based on § 701(j) would fail to adequately protect
working parents.
203. Workplace Religious Freedom Act, S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003).
204. See Kaminer, supra note 199, at 628 (documenting the bill’s introduction in the
House of Representatives in 1994, its reintroduction in both Houses in 1996, as well as
subsequent reintroductions of the bill); see also infra notes 301-303 and accompanying text
(discussing the Workplace Religious Freedom Act).
205. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
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accommodation in the workplace. The same cannot be said with regard to
discrimination against working parents. As Professors Williams and Segal
point out, “[t]hough hostile prescriptive stereotyping is rare in contexts
outside parenthood—most people know enough not to proclaim that
‘woman don’t belong here’—some employers are not yet as savvy when it
comes to family caregivers.”207 A statute mandating accommodation of
working parents would raise the visibility of the work-family conflict and
force employers to address the issue in a meaningful manner. Once forced
to address the issue, employers are more likely to recognize the business
case for instituting a family friendly workplace.
Furthermore, the public discussion that would surround any serious
attempt to enact federal legislation mandating parental accommodation in
the workplace would itself serve a valuable function. In a recent article,
Professors Williams and Segal emphasize the importance of “rights talk” in
fueling social change.208 They argue that “‘rights talk’ can fuel social
change by shaping people’s interpretations of who owes what to whom.”209
The public discussion surrounding any proposed statute mandating parental
accommodation would further encourage this type of rights talk.210
This subpart has discussed why section 701(j) is an appropriate model to
use in developing a statute mandating parental accommodation in the
workplace. The remainder of this Part discusses how courts have
interpreted the terms “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship”
and how these terms should be defined in a statute mandating parental
accommodation in the workplace.
B. Reasonable Accommodation
This subpart examines how federal courts have interpreted the
requirement of reasonable accommodation, and how this requirement
should be defined in a statute mandating parental accommodation in the
workplace. Courts have faced a number of questions in determining
207. Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 95. Professors Williams and
Segal have found that “loose lips” or “hostile prescriptive stereotyping of mothers and
pregnant woman” are commonplace. Id. at 106.
208. Id. at 113-22.
‘Rights talk’ can change what people feel they are entitled to from their employers;
what employers feel they need to provide to their employees; what type of diversity
training is provided; what financial advisors may recommend to improve the
bottom line; what human resource personnel recommend to recruit and retain good
employees; and what corporate counsel advise their clients to do in order to comply
with the law and avoid liability.
Id. at 121.
209. Id. at 113.
210. See id. (stating that “if discrimination language is successful in the court of public
opinion but not in courts of law, it could help spur an effort to enact legislation to protect the
rights people have been convinced they have”).
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whether an employee has been reasonably accommodated under section
701(j),211 and many of these questions are equally relevant with regard to
parental accommodation in the workplace. To what extent is an employee
required to cooperate with his employer and/or make compromises? Is an
accommodation reasonable only if it eliminates the employee’s conflict?
How much economic cost can an employer be required to bear before the
accommodation is no longer considered reasonable? These questions—and
their application to a statute mandating parental accommodation in the
workplace—will be discussed in this Subpart.
1.

Accommodating “bona fide parenting obligations”
To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under section
701(j), an employee must first demonstrate a “bona fide religious belief, the
practice of which conflicted with an employment duty.”212 In other words,
the employee must show that the requested accommodation was for the
type of belief or practice that the statute was enacted to protect.
In developing a statute mandating parental accommodation in the
workplace, the first issue is determining which parental obligations
employers must accommodate. It would be very difficult for employers to
accommodate every instance in which an employee has conflicting work
and family obligations. Working parents may be unable to attend every
soccer game or dance recital and will need to arrange for other people to
care for their children while they work. At the other extreme, absent some
compelling justification, parents should not be forced to choose between
their jobs and caring for a hospitalized child, or leaving a young child at
home alone.213
In a recent article, Professor Smith argues that only “compelling parental
obligations” or family responsibilities that are “compelling and
necessitous” should be accommodated.214 Professor Smith relies on
unemployment compensation case law to develop criteria for determining
211. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 199, at 596-610 (examining how courts have
interpreted the requirement of reasonable accommodation).
212. The courts use a two-part procedure when analyzing claims under § 701(j). First, a
plaintiff must meet a three-part test to establish a prima facie case of religious
discrimination. “The employee must establish that ‘(1) he had a bona fide religious belief,
the practice of which conflicted with an employment duty; (2) he informed his employer of
the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer threatened him or subjected him to
discriminatory treatment . . . .’” See Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1467 n.9
(9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993)). The
employer then has the burden to show that it “negotiate[d] with the employee in an effort to
reasonably accommodate the employee’s religious beliefs.” Id. at 1467 (quoting Heller, 8
F.3d at 1438).
213. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 3, at 1468-70 (describing three cases in which claimants
either resigned or were discharged when faced with childcare concerns that conflicted with
work schedules).
214. See id. at 1471.
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which parental obligations are “compelling.”215 She specifically cites cases
involving employees who were granted unemployment compensation after
being separated from their jobs as a result of a change in their employment
schedules which conflicted with their childcare responsibilities.216 While
the author agrees that this type of “compelling parental obligation” should
certainly be accommodated, the author is also concerned that courts might
interpret “compelling parental obligation” in an overly restrictive manner.
Therefore, the author proposes that an employee should be required to
demonstrate that she has a “bona fide parenting obligation”217 that conflicts
with her employment responsibilities. This more liberal standard should
specifically include two types of parenting obligations not explicitly
discussed by Professor Smith. First, the “bona fide parenting obligation”
standard should recognize that parents may sometimes need to miss work
to attend important appointments regarding their children. For example,
there may be times that parents have no choice but to schedule a child’s
medical appointments during the workday, particularly if the child has
special needs.218 Similarly, parents may need to attend appointments with a
child’s teacher or principal, particularly emergency appointments, which
must be scheduled during the work day.
Second, the bona fide standard should permit the aggregation of events
in determining the importance of a parental obligation. For example, while
it is unlikely that most employees can attend all Little League games or
dance recitals, an employer should have an obligation to accommodate an
employee’s need to occasionally attend some school activities, particularly
because the employee will also have an obligation to compromise and work
with his or her employer in determining which events to attend.219 This
should not present an undue hardship to most employers, as there are
currently state statues that provide parents with a set number of hours off
per year to participate in their children’s school activities.220 While the
215. See id. at 1467-70 (borrowing from the concept of good cause that has been
articulated in unemployment compensation cases involving work-family conflicts).
216. The three cases cited by Professor Smith are White v. Sec. Link, 658 A.2d 619 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1994); Newland v. Job Serv. N.D., 460 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990); and King v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 414 A.2d 452 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980).
217. This standard is also used under § 701(j), which defines religion as including “all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)
(2002); see also Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1996)
(requiring plaintiff to demonstrate a “bona fide religious belief”).
218. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 80 (noting that, due to work related conflicts,
one out of four parents interviewed in a recent study had difficulty making appointments
with medical specialists).
219. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing an employee’s duty to cooperate and compromise
with her employer).
220. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1455 n.63 (listing several examples of state statutes that
allow eligible employees a set number of hours off per year to participate in their children’s
activities).
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definition of “bona fide parenting obligations” will in some instances be
fact specific, this has also been an issue for courts that have addressed
whether an employee has a “bona fide religious belief”221 under section
701(j).
2.

The limitations of Ansonia
Under section 701(j), once an employee establishes a prima facie case of
religious discrimination, a court must determine whether the employee’s
religious needs have been reasonably accommodated. An employer’s
obligation to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious needs was
narrowly interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Ansonia Board
of Education v. Philbrook.222 The Court held that “where the employer has
already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the
statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not further show that
each of the employee’s alternative accommodations would result in undue
hardship.”223 In so ruling, the Court disregarded the EEOC’s 1980
Guidelines which stated that “when there is more than one means of
accommodation which would not cause undue hardship, the employer . . .
must offer the alternative which least disadvantages the individual with
respect to his or her employment opportunities.”224
Ansonia involved a high school teacher, Ronald Philbrook, who was a
member of the Worldwide Church of God and whose religious beliefs
required him to be absent from school to celebrate approximately six
religious holidays each year.225 His employer permitted him to take three
days of authorized paid leave for religious holidays and another three days
of unauthorized leave—time without pay—for any additional holidays that
he could not work.226 Philbrook proposed two alternatives to his
employer’s arrangement—either take paid personal leave,227 or pay for the
cost of a substitute teacher and receive full pay for religious holidays in
excess of the three days allotted for religious observance.228 The employer

221. For example, a recent case discussed whether an employee who was a member of
the Church of Body Modification had a sincerely held religious belief that required her to
display facial piercings at all times. See Cloutier v. Costco, 311 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass.
2004).
222. 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
223. Id. at 68.
224. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (2004).
225. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 62-63.
226. Id. at 64.
227. Id. at 64-65. Philbrook was not permitted to take personal leave since it could not be
used for purposes for which there was already a designated leave and therefore could not be
used for religious reasons. Id. at 63.
228. Id. at 65. This would reduce the cost to Philbrook since in 1984 the cost of hiring a
substitute teacher was $30 a day and Philbrook’s lost pay was $130 a day. Id. at 65 n.3.
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rejected Philbrook’s proposals.229 Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion,
explained that Philbrook’s conflict was not fully resolved because he was
still forced to give up pay in order to follow his religious beliefs.230
Ansonia’s central holding has been criticized for failing to adequately
protect religious employees.231 In developing a statute mandating parental
accommodation in the workplace, the standard articulated by the EEOC,
which was relied upon by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in its
decision in favor of Philbrook232 and by Justice Marshall’s dissenting
opinion in Ansonia,233 should be adopted. An employer should be required
to provide a working parent with the “alternative which least disadvantages
the individual,” so long as doing so does not cause “undue hardship” to the
employer. This standard would provide meaningful accommodation to
working parents and at the same time ensure that an employer not bear an
overly burdensome cost since it is only “bona fide parental obligations”
that must be accommodated, and they only need to be accommodated if
they do not cause “undue hardship” to an employer.
3.

The duty to cooperate and the duty to compromise
The courts generally agree that a religious employee has a duty to
cooperate with his employer in securing an accommodation for his
religious needs.234 Employees, therefore, regularly lose cases when they
fail to make use of means provided by the employer that could have
resolved their conflicts.235 The courts also agree that an employee’s duty to

229. Id. at 65.
230. Id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 199, at 592-96.
232. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 484 (2d Cir. 1985), rev’d, 479
U.S. 60 (1986).
233. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234. See, e.g., Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69 (quoting Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671
F.2d 141, 145-46 (5th Cir. 1982)) (asserting that the employer and the employee must
cooperate in order to find an acceptable accommodation of an employee’s religious beliefs);
Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 501, 503 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that an
employee has an obligation to “be flexible” in finding a solution and that an employer has
satisfied Title VII’s requirements even if it offers a reasonable accommodation that is not
the employee’s preference); Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 223 F.3d 220, 227 (3d
Cir. 2000) (stating that once an employer attempted to negotiate with a religious employee
regarding alternative positions within the organization, the employee had a duty to
cooperate with the employer); Hudson v. W. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 261, 266-67 (9th Cir.
1988) (finding that an employer satisfied Title VII’s requirements when it offered
reasonable means of accommodating a religious employee’s conflicts despite the
employee’s failure to consider the employer’s offer); Weilert v. Health Midwest Dev.
Group, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1197 (D. Kan. 2000) (noting that a religious employee “may
not assert an absolute right to a different accommodation” and that the employee must
attempt to cooperate when the employer offers an accommodation).
235. See, e.g., Hudson, 851 F.2d at 266 (holding that plaintiff had been reasonably
accommodated by her employer and that she failed to make use of her options under the
collective bargaining agreement).
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cooperate arises only after the employer makes an initial attempt to
accommodate the employee.236
The lower courts, do not, however, agree on how far this duty of
employee cooperation extends.
Most courts have determined that
employees do not have an obligation to compromise their religious
beliefs.237 This determination makes sense in the context of religious
accommodation, because it is only when an employee has a sincerely held
religious belief—that is, an unbending belief on which he or she cannot
compromise—that the employee would even invoke the protection of
section 701(j).238 However, some courts have found that the duty of
cooperation places an obligation on the part of employees to compromise
their religious beliefs.239
It is unclear whether an employee’s duty to cooperate includes an
obligation to reschedule his religious observances in cases in which
rescheduling would not require the employee to compromise his religious
beliefs. While the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have stated that an employee
may have an obligation to reschedule where possible,240 the Ninth Circuit
has stated that the duty to cooperate does not necessarily include a duty to
reschedule since “[a]n inflexible duty to reschedule would impose too great
a burden on employees who desire to attend religious ceremonies for which

236. See, e.g., Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing
that the employee’s obligation to cooperate only arises after the employer has offered a
potential accommodation); Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1488-89 (10th Cir.
1989) (holding that an employee’s duty to cooperate was not triggered because the employer
failed to make an initial effort to accommodate the employee’s religious beliefs).
237. See Brener, 671 F.2d at 146 n.3 (stating that “[o]f course, an employee is not
required to modify his religious beliefs . . . only to attempt to satisfy them within procedures
offered by the employer”); see also United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n
v. IBP, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 147, 154 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (stating that the employee’s duty to
cooperate does not include a concomitant obligation to compromise the religious beliefs that
Title VII was designed to protect).
238. See, e.g., Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding
that in order to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, an employee must
begin by proving the existence of a “sincere religious belief that conflicts with an
employment requirement”).
239. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1977)
(determining that the plaintiff had failed “to consider any sort of compromise insofar as his
religion was concerned”).
240. See Howard v. Haverty Furniture Cos., 615 F.2d 203, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1980)
(finding that plaintiff made no effort to find a substitute minister to officiate at a funeral or
to change the date of the funeral and, as a result of his absence, the employer suffered
“undue hardship”); see also Dachman v. Shalala, No. 00-1641, 2001 WL 533760, at *4 (4th
Cir. May 18, 2001) (determining that Title VII did not mandate that an employer allow an
Orthodox Jewish plaintiff to leave work early on Friday afternoon to conduct her preSabbath preparations because the employee could perform many of the tasks during the
week or on the Sabbath and because her religious beliefs did not require that she complete
all of the preparations on Friday).
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they might be able to change the date or time, such as baptisms,
confirmations, or weddings.”241
With regard to parental accommodation in the workplace, parents should
be required to make a good faith effort to resolve their work-family
conflicts before asking for any accommodation from their employer,242 as
well as to compromise with their employer after asking for the
accommodation.
This distinction recognizes that while religious
observances usually cannot be rescheduled, many types of parental
obligations can be rescheduled.243
For example, routine doctor
appointments and parent-teacher conferences should not be scheduled at
the same time as important meetings and whenever possible should not be
scheduled during the workday. If parents are given advance notice of a
change in their schedules, they should be required to make a good faith
attempt to find alternative childcare.244 This requirement differs from cases
of religious accommodation where the employee’s obligation to
compromise only arises after the employer attempts to accommodate the
religious employee. Therefore, a significantly higher level of compromise
can be required of parents seeking accommodation in the workplace than
that required of religious employees seeking accommodation under section
701(j).
On the other hand, some bona fide parenting obligations, such as
unexpected childcare emergencies, cannot be rescheduled. For example, if
a young child wakes up with the flu one morning, or becomes ill during the
school day, a parent may be unable to find alternative childcare on such
short notice. Similarly, a babysitter may cancel at the last minute, or a day
care center may unexpectedly close. On some occasions, a parent may
know in advance of a bona fide parenting obligation that requires time off
from work, such as an appointment with a medical specialist that can be
made only during the workday. Virtually every parent will at some point
experience a childcare bind whether from illness, unexpected school
closings, or emergency appointments.
A gray area exists in which it is questionable whether a parent has made
a good faith effort to work with the employer. For example, one
commentator writes of a mother who had a conflict with her boss since she
left work at 3:40 on a number of Wednesdays to take her son for his weekly
241. Heller, 8 F.3d at 1439.
242. Smith, supra note 3, at 1472-73. It makes economic sense for the employer to work
with the employee since no one solution is best for all employees or all workplaces.
WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 86.
243. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1473.
244. See id. at 1472 & n.155 (arguing that if an employee is notified in advance of a
change in her work schedule to include weekend hours the employee should be required to
attempt to find alternative childcare).
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asthma shots.245 While her husband or the child’s grandmother could have
taken her son to the appointment, the mother wanted to go because her son
was scared of the shots.246 In a case such as this, where other trusted family
members are available, the employee should have an obligation to
compromise.
4.

The issue of choice
An issue that arises in cases involving religious accommodation in the
workplace that has also been raised in the context of work-family conflicts
is the issue of “choice.”247 Some commentators have suggested that just as
individuals “choose” religion, individuals also choose whether to become
parents and once parents, they choose whether or not to work. According
to this line of reasoning, both religion and parenting are little more than
personal lifestyle choices.
One commentator has suggested that section 701(j) may be a good model
for parental accommodation in the workplace specifically because it “is
based upon the notion that a person’s religious practices are a fundamental
right, even if voluntarily adopted.”248 This argument misses the point,
however, that a truly religious employee does not view religious
observance as a matter of personal choice. As one commentator explained,
“It would come as some surprise to a devout Jew to find that he has
selected the day of the week in which to refrain from labor, since the
Jewish people have been under the impression for some 3,000 years that
this choice was made by God.”249 In surveying the section 701(j) case law,
it is not surprising that courts engaged in rhetoric implying that religious
belief and observance are nothing more than a personal choice are unlikely
to require an employer to reasonably accommodate a religious employee.250

245. HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 135-38.
246. Id. at 137-38.
247. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1608-34 (explaining how the rhetoric of choice is inappropriately
used when discussing the work-family conflict) [hereinafter Williams, Gender Wars];
Kessler, supra note 3, at 441-44 (discussing the limitations of “rational choice theory,”
which assumes that individuals engage in certain activities only after performing a costbenefit analysis and determining that the activity is in the individual’s best interest).
248. Kessler, supra note 3, at 457-58. Kessler criticizes the “choice” theory with regard
to parental accommodation in the workplace because it effectively narrows a parent’s right
to accommodation. Id. at 448-68.
249. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
115, 125 (1992).
250. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting that
the plaintiff had failed to “consider any sort of compromise insofar as his religion was
concerned”). This conviction that religious belief and observance are a matter of personal
choice is connected to the issue of an employee’s obligation to compromise his religious
beliefs, since a court that requires an employee to compromise his religious beliefs implies
that these beliefs are nothing more than a lifestyle choice.
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Similarly, both courts251 and critics252 who dismiss the importance of
workplace accommodation for parents often refer to the conflict these
parents face as little more than a lifestyle choice they have voluntarily
assumed. A number of legal commentators have discussed the flaws in this
reasoning.253 People do not always “choose” to become parents, and even
when they do voluntarily choose to parent, it does not logically follow that
society should not have an obligation to contributing to the cost of raising
the next generation of citizens.254 This choice reasoning also ignores the
fact that the choices given to the primary caretaker, who is usually the
mother, are fundamentally unfair choices. As Professor Williams explains,
“In the work/family context, the rhetoric of choice masks a gender system
that defines childrearing and the accepted avenues of adult advancement as
inconsistent and then allocates the resulting costs of childrearing to
mothers.”255 Furthermore, most women who are single, divorced, or do not
have a high-wage earning spouse cannot simply choose not to work256 but
rather must work to provide food and shelter for their children. A parent
with custody of a child similarly cannot simply choose not to care for the

251. See United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (determining that as a result of family
responsibilities, women voluntarily chose lower-paying jobs), aff’d, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.
1988); see also Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 247, at 1608 (stating that Sears’
argument in the case that women’s marginalized economic status is a direct result of their
personal choice of lower-paying work that enables them to spend more time at home with
their families is commonly accepted by both conservative and liberal courts).
252. See, e.g., BURKETT, supra note 39, at 197 (stating that society generally should not
reward or punish individuals’ private choices based on their impact on the public good, “or
at least history teaches us about the dangers of doing so”).
253. See generally Eichner, supra note 118, at 147 (stating that the “parenting-as-choice”
theory fails to consider the question of whether society has an interest in protecting
children); Kessler, supra note 3, at 441-43 (discussing the limitations of applying rational
choice theory to women’s cultural caregiving); Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 247, at
1615 (stating that choice rhetoric fails to recognize the constraints within which women
make choices about parenting); Wright-Carozza, supra note 37, at 577-78 (arguing that the
legal system’s assumption that pregnancy and parenthood are merely products of personal
choice fails to recognize the social value of having and raising children).
254. See Eichner, supra note 118, at 147 (stating that interpreting the choice theory to
deny legal protection ignores the question of whether “society has some interest in and
responsibility to children once parents have ‘chosen’ to bear them,” and concluding that
society owes an obligation to help all human beings, regardless of whether their existence is
a product of parental “choice”); Wright-Carozza, supra note 37, at 578 (questioning the
premise that pregnancy and parenthood are always voluntarily undertaken, and asserting that
even if these conditions are voluntary, society should share some of the costs of supporting
workers who bear and raise children); see also supra Part II.D (emphasizing the importance
of child-rearing in ensuring the future of our society and discussing the harm to society
when parents are unable to spend adequate time with their children).
255. Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 247, at 1596.
256. See id. at 1610. A recent cover story in The New York Times Magazine recognized
that becoming a stay-at-home mother is usually only an option for “elite successful women
who can afford real choice—who have partners with substantial salaries and health
insurance.” Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, at 42.
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child because the parent would violate child welfare laws.257
There is a risk that courts will rely on the choice line of reasoning to
narrowly interpret a statute mandating parental accommodation in the
workplace. It is therefore important to emphasize that “bona fide parenting
obligations” are not simply a matter of personal choice. While employees
should have an obligation to work with their employers in reaching an
accommodation, this obligation should not negate the employers’ duty to
accommodate. While both caregiving and religious belief may not be
immutable characteristics in the sense of race, gender, and national origin,
they are also more than a matter of personal lifestyle “choice” and are
worthy of federal protection.
5.

Elimination of the employee’s conflict
An issue that has surfaced in the section 701(j) case law is whether an
accommodation can be reasonable if it does not eliminate the religious
employee’s conflict. The Supreme Court determined that a reasonable
accommodation is an accommodation that “eliminates the conflict between
[the employee’s] employment requirements and religious practices,”258 and
the lower courts have generally refused to find an accommodation
reasonable if it could not possibly eliminate the religious employee’s
conflict.259 However, the lower courts have also determined that an
accommodation with the potential to eliminate a religious employee’s
conflict can be a reasonable accommodation even if it does not actually
eliminate the conflict.260 For example, the courts tend to agree that a
257. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.03 (West 2000) (criminalizing a “caregiver’s
failure or omission to provide a child with the care, supervision, and services necessary to
maintain the child’s physical and mental health, including, but not limited to, food, nutrition,
clothing, shelter, [and] supervision . . . that a prudent person would consider essential for the
well-being of the child”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 2000) (providing that a
“person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when . . . [h]e knowingly acts in a
manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than
seventeen years old”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304 (West 1983) (providing that a
“parent . . . commits a misdemeanor . . . if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child
by violating a duty of care, protection, or support”).
258. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986).
259. See, e.g., United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Ilona of
Hungary, 108 F.3d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that an employer did not reasonably
accommodate a Jewish employee who requested time off of work for Yom Kippur by
offering to give the employee another day off instead); Pedersen v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, 978
F. Supp. 926, 933 (D. Neb. 1997) (finding that an employee who requested Easter Sunday
off was not reasonably accommodated when her employer only gave her part of the day off).
260. See, e.g., Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1153, 1156-57
(10th Cir. 2000) (ruling that an employer reasonably accommodated a postal employee who
was a Sabbatarian by approving use of leave, permitting voluntary substitutes to work in the
employee’s place, and seeking a waiver from Sabbath work from the union, even though the
employer occasionally required the employee to work on the Sabbath); Grant v. Fairview
Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., No. Civ. 02-4232JNEJGL, 2004 WL 326694, at *4 (D. Minn.
Feb. 18, 2004) (concluding that there is no requirement that an accommodation entirely
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voluntary shift swap within a neutral rotating shift system is a reasonable
means of accommodating an employee who requests religious leave
regardless of whether there are other employees willing to swap shifts with
the religious employee.261
This reasoning has been criticized by legal commentators262 and
amendments to section 701(j) have been introduced in the House and
Senate stating that a reasonable accommodation under section 701(j) is an
accommodation that actually eliminates the religious employee’s
conflict.263 A statute mandating parental accommodation in the workplace
should clearly state that a reasonable accommodation is an accommodation
that in fact removes the conflict between an employee’s employment
obligation and “bona fide parenting obligations.”
6.

Costs that an employee can be required to bear
a.

Unpaid leave

Employees who request religious accommodation in the workplace are
sometimes accommodated through the use of unpaid leave.264 Based upon
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ansonia, unpaid leave which allows an
employee to observe religious holy days is a reasonable accommodation
unless “paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious ones.”265
The lower courts have agreed that a reasonable accommodation can require
an employee to bear some economic costs,266 and in so determining, have
eliminate the employee’s conflict to be considered “reasonable” and noting that Ansonia did
not impose such a requirement).
261. See, e.g., Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1088 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating
that shift-swapping constitutes a reasonable accommodation of a religious employee, unless
the employee believes that it is morally wrong to work on Sundays and that it is a sin to ask
someone else to work in the employee’s place on Sunday); Moore v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
727 F. Supp. 1156, 1160 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding that an employer reasonably
accommodated a religious employee when it allowed the employee to make shift swaps and
“encouraged and solicited” other employees to swap shifts with the religious employee).
262. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 199, at 630 (urging Congress to adopt the position
that an accommodation is only reasonable under § 701(j) when it entirely resolves the
employee’s religious conflict).
263. See, e.g., Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 1997, S. 1124, 105th Cong.
§ 2(b)(2) (1997) (stating that “an accommodation by the employer shall not be deemed to be
reasonable if such accommodation does not remove the conflict between employment
requirements and the religious observance or practice of the employee”).
264. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986) (suggesting
that a school board’s decision to allow an employee to use unpaid leave to observe religious
holidays in excess of three days annually constituted a reasonable accommodation of the
employee’s religious beliefs).
265. Id. at 71.
266. See, e.g., Pinsker v. Joint Dist. No. 28J, 735 F.2d 388, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding that Title VII does not require that employers accommodate employees’ religious
practices in a way that avoids any costs to the employee whatsoever); Vaughn v. Waffle
House, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that an accommodation
resulting in a reduction in salary was not unreasonable merely because it required the
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tipped the balance of section 701(j) in favor of the employer and against the
religious employee.267
There are instances where employees with work-family conflicts are
accommodated through the use of unpaid leave. Some working parents
specifically request time off without pay to tend to their childcare
responsibilities, and for these employees unpaid leave would constitute a
reasonable accommodation.268 However, there are also many parents,
particularly those in low paying and minimum wage jobs, who simply
cannot afford to take unpaid leave.269 For these employees, time off
without pay would not be a reasonable accommodation. Instead, other
accommodations such as flextime or shift swaps should be offered.270
Whether, and the extent to which, time off without pay constitutes a
reasonable accommodation will be a very fact-specific determination for
the courts.
b.

Use of vacation days

One way that employers accommodate religious employees is by
permitting them to take vacation days on their religious holidays. Lower
courts are in agreement that requiring an employee to use some vacation
days to observe religious holy days can be a reasonable accommodation,271
but requiring an employee to potentially use all the allotted vacation time to
refrain from work on a religious holiday is not a reasonable
accommodation.272 While inevitably a fact-specific determination, this

employee to bear some cost in observing religious holidays). Costs to the employee are
clearly a significant legal issue since Title VII prohibits religious discrimination with respect
to “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) (2000).
267. Employers, who in general have deeper pockets and are therefore better able to
absorb the cost, are almost never required to bear an economic cost in accommodating a
religious employee. See infra Part IV.C.1.
268. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 133-44 (describing a
working mother who used her paid vacation days to work a four-day week only after her
employer had refused her preferred accommodation which was to work a reduced schedule
with reduced pay).
269. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 131-34 (noting that “low-income working
parents were significantly more likely to lack both workplace flexibility and social
supports,” often forcing them to choose between losing pay in order to care for sick children
and leaving sick children at home).
270. Both flextime and paid leave have been shown to be a reasonable means of
accommodating parents with childcare emergencies. Id. at 58-59, 65.
271. See, e.g., Getz v. Pennsylvania, 802 F.2d 72, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1986) (determining that
the plaintiff was reasonably accommodated because she was able to have her religious
holidays off without using up most of her vacation time).
272. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1379 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
that “[a]n employer who permits an employee to avoid mandatory Sabbath work only by
using accrued vacation does not ‘reasonably accommodate’ the employee’s religious
beliefs,” because the employee effectively loses a benefit which is available to other
employees who do not have the same religious conflict).
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would also be the appropriate balance to use in cases involving the workfamily conflict, and the literature illustrates that paid vacation days help
working parents balance their work and family responsibilities.273
c.

Part-time employment

One significant issue that arises in the context of parental
accommodation in the workplace, which is not an issue in cases of religious
accommodation, is the use of part-time employment as a means of
accommodating employees.274 Many employees, particularly working
mothers, may choose to work fewer hours at reduced pay so that they can
spend additional time with their children.275 The problem is that these parttime employees often do not receive proportionately equal compensation in
terms of salary, benefits, and bonuses as compared to full-time
employees.276 For example, as a result of “schedule creep,”—where an
employee’s schedule creeps back towards full-time—many part-time
employees work longer hours than originally agreed upon, which results in
a lower per hour salary.277 In fact, the average hourly wage of part-time
employees is only sixty percent of the average hourly wage of a full-time
employee.278 Many part-time employees also receive no benefits.279 Parttime employees are often not taken seriously by employers and suffer in
273. See HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 58 (noting that only forty-two percent of parents
were able to stay home from work when their children were sick, and more than one-half of
those parents stated that they could stay home because their employer provided paid leave).
Twenty-nine percent of parents who were able to stay home with an ill child used paid
vacation days to do so. Id.
274. The availability of part-time work is generally not an issue in cases of religious
accommodation because religious employees usually do not need to significantly reduce
their work hours. But see Vaughn v. Waffle House, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1077, 1083
(N.D. Tex. 2003) (determining that a Sabbatarian was reasonably accommodated when he
was transferred to a position that required fewer hours of work but paid less).
275. A number of commentators have suggested that the American workweek should be
reduced. See Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 29, at 466-71 (advocating a thirty-five-hour
work week in order to create “family-friendly and gender-equitable working
arrangements”); Williams, Canaries, supra note 3, at 2230 (explaining that both men and
women seek more balanced hours because they seek to achieve success in their careers and
to spend more time with their children).
276. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 96 (discussing the differences
in wages paid to part-time and full-time employees and noting that studies suggest that
employers “exact a price for part-time work in terms of pay, benefits, and promotion”).
277. See Williams, Canaries, supra note 3, at 2224 (describing the situation of part-time
attorneys whose schedules begin moving back towards full-time); see also HOCHSCHILD,
THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 99-100 (noting that the only way that an employee can
successfully keep a part-time schedule “without violating the unspoken rules of the
workplace” is to effectively work full time).
278. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 96. This discrepancy in
hourly wages is in part due to the fact that part-time jobs tend to involve work that is
traditionally performed by women where even full-time employees are poorly paid. Id.
However, only about one-half of this discrepancy can be explained by objective factors such
as sex. Id.
279. Cf. Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 29, at 467.
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terms of promotional opportunities and professional advancement.280
Negative stereotypes regarding working mothers, as well as working
fathers who take an active caregiving role, are prevalent in the
workplace,281 and one of the points at which this “maternal wall”
discrimination is most likely to surface is when a working mother requests
a flexible work schedule or part-time work.282
Part-time employment should not constitute a reasonable
accommodation in cases in which these problems exist. Rather, part-time
employment should only constitute a “reasonable accommodation” if the
employee’s total compensation and benefits are proportionately equal to
that of a full-time employee and the employee has meaningful
opportunities for promotion.283
d.

Transfer of position

Transferring a religious employee to another position, even if the
position is less desirable, has been deemed a reasonable accommodation so
long as the employee’s employment status is reasonably preserved.284 The
issue of whether an employee transfer constitutes a reasonable
accommodation in the workplace is likely to be a more prevalent issue with
parental accommodation than with religious accommodation.
This
difference is because most religious employees only occasionally need time
off for religious observances, and therefore a permanent transfer to a
position with different days or hours is usually not necessary. In fact, it
would only be an option for Sabbatarians, who need time off on a recurring
weekly basis.
On the other hand, many working parents may need to change their
employment hours on a regular basis and one of the points at which an
employee with caregiving obligations is likely to face discrimination is
when she requests a modified work schedule.285 It is therefore essential
that a statute mandating parental accommodation in the workplace clearly
280. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 72-75 (discussing how parttime employees are marginalized in the workplace).
281. See generally Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 90-102 (discussing
stereotypes about employees who are family caregivers).
282. Id. at 78.
283. See generally Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 29, at 467-68 (proposing that all
workers receive a benefits package, the extent of which would vary depending on the
number of hours worked per week); Williams, Canaries, supra note 3, at 2233 (discussing
how the maternal wall harms attorneys who are mothers).
284. See, e.g., Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (determining that
it was a reasonable accommodation to transfer a postal inspector to a position where he
would undergo a 90 day period where he would be without seniority); Wright v. Runyon, 2
F.3d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding a reasonable accommodation where a Sabbatarian
was given an opportunity to bid on other positions where he would not have to work on the
Sabbath, even though he considered those positions less desirable).
285. See Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 77-78.
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state that a transfer to another position is only a reasonable accommodation
if it substantially preserves an employee’s employment status.
This subpart has examined how the federal courts have interpreted the
“reasonable accommodation” requirement of section 701(j) and how
“reasonable accommodation” should be interpreted with regard to parental
accommodation in the workplace. The next subpart addresses the “undue
hardship” standard.
C. Undue Hardship
Section 701(j) requires an employer to accommodate a religious
employee unless the employer can demonstrate that “he is unable to
reasonably accommodate . . . an employee’s or prospective employee’s
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of
[his] business.”286 This subpart examines the ways in which courts have
interpreted the term “undue hardship,” and how this term should be defined
in a statute mandating parental accommodation in the workplace.
In determining whether an accommodation for an employee’s religious
needs constitutes undue hardship, the federal courts have addressed a
number of issues which are also likely to arise with regard to parental
accommodation in the workplace.287 For example, the lower courts have
determined that employers are almost never required to incur economic or
efficiency costs in accommodating a religious employee.288 Additionally,
the courts tend to agree that hypothetical hardships do not generally
constitute undue hardship.289 However, the courts are split on the extent to
which an accommodation can cause undue hardship based on its impact on

286. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000) (emphasis added).
287. See generally Kaminer, supra note 199, at 610-22 (discussing how the lower courts
have interpreted the term “undue hardship”).
288. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States W. Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1341 (8th
Cir. 1995) (stating that an employer is not required to permit an employee to wear a button
with a picture of an aborted fetus on it when doing so causes substantial disruption and a
decline in productivity in the workplace); Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1380
(6th Cir. 1994) (finding it an undue hardship to require an employer to hire an additional
worker or risk reduced productivity in order to accommodate an employee’s inability to
work on the Sabbath); Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding
that an employer was not required to excuse an employee from work every Friday for
religious reasons since accommodation proposals involved significant economic costs).
289. See, e.g., Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1996)
(dismissing the employer’s concern with hypothetical hardships); Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco,
Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1492 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding liability too speculative where an
employer refuses to hire a potential employee who uses peyote for religious purposes
because actual harm would be eliminated by merely requiring the potential employee to
abstain from work for twenty-four hours after each ceremonial use of the drug); Brown v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 960-61 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that the employer’s
burden of proving an undue hardship is not met by merely stating a fear that there may be
even greater costs if more Sabbatarians come forward and request accommodations).
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a religious employee’s colleagues.290 These issues, and their application to
a statute mandating parental accommodation in the workplace, will be
discussed in this subpart.
1.

Defining undue hardship
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,291 the United States Supreme
Court limited an employer’s obligation to accommodate a religious
employee by defining undue hardship as any cost greater than de
minimis.292 Based on the holding in Hardison, lower courts have broadly
interpreted undue hardship, thereby requiring only a minimal level of
accommodation. More specifically, lower courts, on a case-by-case basis,
have consistently determined that employers are not required to incur any
economic cost or cost in terms of lost efficiency in accommodating a
religious employee.293 Undue hardship has been found in cases where the
employer would have to make do without the religious employee,294 where
accommodation would involve the complex shuffling of employees,295
where accommodation would involve administrative costs,296 where the
employer would essentially be permitting a part-time employee to receive
full-time benefits,297 where accommodation would cause a decrease in
employee productivity,298 and where the employer would have to incur the
cost of a replacement employee.299
290. See generally Kaminer, supra note 199, at 616-21 (explaining that while the Fifth
Circuit has focused on employee complaints, the Ninth Circuit has gone a step further and
has analyzed whether the employee complaints are valid).
291. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
292. Id. at 84. The Hardison dissent expressed concern with this standard and “seriously
question[ed]” whether undue hardship could be defined so broadly as to constitute any cost
more than de minimis. See id. at 93 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
293. See Kaminer, supra note 199, at 614 (“The courts, however, have not specifically
articulated a rule that such accommodation always constitutes undue hardship, and have
therefore left open the possibility that some economic or efficiency costs could be required
of employers in future cases.”).
294. See, e.g., Mann v. Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1369-70 (8th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that
requiring the employer to “just do without” the employee in need of accommodation would
result in lost productivity).
295. See, id. (criticizing an employee’s proposed accommodations that would require her
co-workers to either work overtime in her place, increase their work rotations, or otherwise
absorb the effects of the employee’s absence).
296. See, e.g., Wisner v. Truck Cent., 784 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming
the district court’s conclusion that an employer would suffer undue hardship if it
accommodated a religious employee’s inability to work on his Sabbath).
297. See, e.g., Lee v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019, 1021-23 (10th Cir. 1994)
(observing that an employee’s proposed accommodation would allow him to obtain benefits
that he had not earned under the collective bargaining agreement); Cook v. Chrysler Corp.,
981 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that the proposed accommodation would allow an
employee to receive undeserved benefits).
298. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1380 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding it
an undue hardship to require an employer to hire additional workers or risk reduced
productivity in order to accommodate an employee’s inability to work on the Sabbath).
299. See, e.g., Lee, 22 F.3d at 1023-24 (addressing the cost of bringing in a driver from
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The de minimis standard has been criticized by legal commentators who
argue that it significantly limits an employer’s obligation to accommodate
and therefore fails to adequately protect religious employees.300 The
Workplace Religious Freedom Act,301 which has been introduced numerous
times in both the House of Representatives and the Senate,302 would amend
section 701(j) and define undue hardship as an accommodation “requiring
significant difficulty or expense”303 which is the standard applied under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).304
A statute mandating parental accommodation in the workplace should
clearly state that undue hardship is a cost “requiring significant difficulty
and expense” rather than any cost greater than de minimis. There are a
number of reasons why this ADA standard should be used. As the section
701(j) case law illustrates, the de minimis standard has significantly limited
the protection given to religious employees and a stronger standard is
therefore needed.305 In addition, federal courts tend to focus on formal
equality and are hesitant to mandate affirmative action or differential
treatment of employees in the workplace.306 Therefore, a statute mandating
another city to work on the Sabbath); Cooper, 15 F.3d at 1380 (reiterating that hiring an
additional worker to work an entire week so that an employee can take every Saturday off is
more than a de minimis cost); Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir.
1982) (upholding the district court’s finding that hiring an additional employee imposed
more than a de minimis cost and that using an existing employee as a substitute “resulted in
decreased efficiency, economic loss, and increased risk to patients”).
300. See Kaminer, supra note 199, at 628-29 (recommending that Congress amend
Section 701(j) so that undue hardship is defined as a meaningful and significant cost);
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 704 (1992) (suggesting that the stronger undue
hardship standard used in evaluating accommodations for disabled persons should apply to
religious accommodations).
301. See, e.g., Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003, S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003);
Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2002, S. 2572, 107th Cong. (2002); Workplace
Religious Freedom Act of 2002, H.R. 4237, 106th Cong. (2000).
302. Workplace Religious Freedom Act, S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003). See also Kaminer,
supra note 199, at 628-29 (noting that the Workplace Religious Freedom Act was
introduced in 1994 in the House of Representatives, reintroduced in 1996 in the House and
Senate, and has been reintroduced again in subsequent sessions of Congress).
303. See, e.g., Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003, S. 893, 108th Cong. § 2(a)
(2003).
304. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
305. See supra notes 291-299 and accompanying text (highlighting cases where courts
have rejected a proposed accommodation because it imposed more than a de minimis
burden on the employer).
306. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1567 (3d Cir. 1996) (agreeing that Title
VII does not permit an employer to enact a non-remedial affirmative action policy that uses
race as the deciding factor in an effort to promote diversity); Engel, supra note 12, at 320
(“Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination has generally been read as requiring that
employers apply workplace requirements and regulations ‘neutrally.’”). But see Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 637-40 (1987) (permitting a voluntary remedial affirmative
action plan because it addressed a manifest imbalance of women in the workforce, used
gender as only one of a number of factors and did not trammel the rights of male
employees).
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parental accommodation in the workplace should be worded strongly
enough that the courts would be limited in their ability to read it narrowly.
Professor Smith raises a number of concerns with the “significant
difficulty or expense” standard and instead suggests using an intermediate
standard that would define undue hardship as an accommodation that
imposes more than a moderate cost on an employer.307 Because more
employees will need parental accommodation than religious
accommodation, Professor Smith fears that the “significant difficulty or
expense” standard would place too great a burden on employers.308
However, as previously explained, in many instances employers can save
money in the long term if they accommodate working parents.309
Furthermore, in situations where accommodating the bona fide parenting
obligations of working parents imposes costs, employers should be
permitted to consider the total cost of accommodating all employees
requesting accommodation, and not simply the cost of accommodating any
one employee. Therefore, even if there is a greater absolute number of
employees requesting parental accommodation than the number requesting
religious accommodation, the employer’s total cost should be no greater.
Professor Smith also expressed concern that employees may abuse a
parental accommodation statute.310 While this abuse may occur in some
cases, there are many working parents who are currently hesitant to use
flexible work policies due to negative stereotypes associated with
employees who work a modified schedule.311 In addition, while Professor
Smith’s intermediate standard would limit the total number of cases in
which an employer must accommodate an employee, it would limit both
valid requests as well as fraudulent requests for parental accommodation.
Furthermore, as Professor Smith acknowledges, in some cases, employers
could ask for documentation proving the employee had a valid parental
obligation.312
Finally Professor Smith states that a parental accommodation statute
raises “gender segregationist concerns,” as the enactment of such a statute
may lead employers to refuse to hire women based upon concern that
women are most likely to ask for parental accommodation.313 This concern
is valid, and Professor Smith wisely suggests that the government share the

307. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1479-86.
308. Id. at 1483 (noting that forty percent of workers in the United States have children
under the age of eighteen).
309. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
310. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1479-86.
311. See supra Part IV.B.6.c (discussing the problems associated with part-time
employment).
312. See id. at 1484.
313. See id. at 1484-85.
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However, it appears
cost of accommodation with employers.314
counterproductive to advocate a statute mandating parental accommodation
in the workplace, which in large part serves to level the playing field for
working mothers, and then fail to draft the statute in a meaningful way for
fear that the statute itself will cause discrimination. Women who are
discriminated against are also protected by Title VII.
2.

Hypothetical hardships
In determining whether an employer will suffer an undue hardship in
accommodating a religious employee, a recurring issue is whether
hypothetical hardships constitute undue hardship.315
The issue of
hypothetical hardships arises both in cases in which there may be other
employees potentially in need of religious accommodation, as well as in
cases where the costs of accommodating only the employee requesting the
accommodation are speculative.316
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the Supreme Court relied on
hypothetical costs to Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) in determining that
the company would suffer an undue hardship if it accommodated
Hardison.317 In dismissing the dissent’s argument that accommodating
Hardison would not result in more than a de minimis cost to TWA, the
Hardison Court stated that the dissent “ignores . . . the express finding of
the District Court . . . and it fails to take account of the likelihood that a
company as large as TWA may have many employees whose religious
observances, like Hardison’s, prohibit them from working on Saturdays or
Sundays.”318
The lower courts, however, have essentially ignored the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Hardison, and most agree that an employer must
establish that it will suffer an actual undue hardship in accommodating a
religious employee and that speculative or hypothetical hardships are
insufficient.319 Some courts, however, have expressed concern with
hypothetical hardships in cases in which a religious employee’s co-workers
might be adversely impacted by an accommodation.320
314. See id. at 1485-86 (reasoning that the government has an interest in encouraging
parental accommodation because good parenting benefits society).
315. See Kaminer, supra note 199, at 611-13 (reviewing how various court of appeals
have addressed the issue of hypothetical hardships).
316. Id.
317. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977).
318. Id. at 84 n.15.
319. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
320. See Virts v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 285 F.3d 508, 517-21 (6th Cir. 2002)
(finding that the religious employee’s proposed accommodations had the potential to
adversely affect the seniority rights of other employees under the collective bargaining
agreement); Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000)
(determining it was an undue hardship to “skip over” a driver requesting religious
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By ignoring the Hardison Court’s reasoning and by generally refusing to
equate hypothetical hardships with undue hardship, the lower courts appear
reluctant to interpret undue hardship in a manner that would essentially
render section 701(j) meaningless. As the Eighth Circuit explained, “Were
the law otherwise, any accommodation, however slight, would rise to the
level of an undue hardship because, if sufficiently magnified through
predictions of the future behavior of the employee’s co-workers, even the
minutest accommodation could be calculated to reach that level.”321
The issue of hypothetical hardships is somewhat different with regard to
parental accommodation in the workplace. Equating hypothetical hardship
with undue hardship would not necessarily render a statute mandating
parental accommodation meaningless, because a business argument can be
made for restructuring the workplace to more generally accommodate
working parents. In other words, if an employer were to accommodate a
larger number of employees it may receive “hypothetical benefits,” instead
of suffering “hypothetical hardships.” These benefits are demonstrated by
economic studies indicating that once long-term costs are taken into
consideration, Flexible Work Arrangements (FWAs) may save employers
money by decreasing costs associated with “attrition, absenteeism,
recruiting, quality control, and productivity.”322 Just as the business
argument for accommodation can be used in response to an employer’s
business necessity defense under Title VII, it could also be used to show
that an employer will not necessarily suffer undue hardship under a statute
modeled on section 701(j), even if hypothetical hardships are considered.
3.

Employee complaints
Despite the fact that section 701(j) refers to “undue hardship on the
conduct of an employer’s business,”323 the lower courts agree that an
employer can also demonstrate undue hardship by showing that an
accommodation would adversely impact the religious employee’s coworkers, such as by requiring a non-religious colleague to work the
religious employee’s less desirable shift.324 In so determining, the lower
courts have relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hardison in which
the Court was clearly as concerned with the effect Hardison’s proposed
accommodations would have on his colleagues as with the cost of these
accommodation because the other drivers might be sent on shorter less profitable runs and
would have less rest and time off between runs).
321. Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 961 (8th Cir. 1979) (quoting Haring v.
Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (D.D.C. 1979)).
322. See Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 88; see also WILLIAMS,
UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 88-94; supra Part II.E (discussing how employers are
harmed by refusing to accommodate working parents).
323. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
324. See Kaminer, supra note 199, at 617.

KAMINER.OFFTOPRINTER

2004]

8/9/2005 1:10:24 PM

THE WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT

357

accommodations on his employer.325
There is, however, a lack of consensus on the extent to which employee
grumbling alone, or a decrease in employee morale regarding the religious
employee’s accommodation, should be a factor in determining whether coworkers have been adversely affected in a manner that constitutes undue
hardship.326 While some courts have focused on employee complaints,
other courts have gone a step further and have analyzed whether these
employee complaints are, in fact, justified.
In determining that an accommodation did not constitute undue hardship,
the Ninth Circuit has focused on the actual burden the religious employee’s
co-workers would suffer. For example, the Ninth Circuit determined that a
Sabbatarian could be accommodated at an inspection center that was open
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week without causing the employer
undue hardship since the plaintiff was willing to work an equal number of
undesirable shifts in exchange for his Sabbath off.327 Refusing to rely on
employee complaints, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[e]ven proof that
employees would grumble about a particular accommodation is not enough
to establish undue hardship.”328 In a different case, the Ninth Circuit
determined that an employer of a “Christian, faith-operated business”
would not suffer undue hardship in permitting an employee who was an
atheist to be excused from mandatory devotional services. The court
explained that a claim of undue hardship must “be supported by proof of
actual imposition on coworkers or disruption of the work routine.”329
The Fifth Circuit, however, has placed more emphasis on the complaints
of other employees and decreased employee morale. In Brener v.
Diagnostic Center Hospital,330 a hospital pharmacist refused to work on his

325. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977).
326. Professor Smith concludes that employers may not deny the preferences of a
religious employee’s colleagues when accommodating the religious employee and supports
this statement by citing Eversley v. Mbank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1988). Smith,
supra note 3, at 1498-99. While the author agrees that the Fifth Circuit has relied heavily on
employee complaints in determining whether an employer will suffer an undue hardship, the
author disagrees with Professor’s Smith conclusion that the lower courts have reached a
consensus on this issue.
327. Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1472 (9th Cir. 1996).
328. Id. at 1473 (quoting Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d
397, 402 (9th Cir. 1978)); see also Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 607 (9th
Cir.) (finding that an employer does not suffer undue hardship “merely because the
[religious] employee’s co-workers find his conduct irritating or unwelcome”). However, an
employer will suffer undue hardship if the religious employee engages in behavior that
would “demean or degrade” his co-workers. Id. at 608.
329. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg.
Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also Bynum v. Fort Worth
Indep. Sch. Dist., 41 F. Supp. 2d 641, 556 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (indicating that the plaintiff’s
colleagues were justified in their resentment of taking on the plaintiff’s duties).
330. 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982).
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religious holidays.331 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the hospital that
requiring other employees to trade shifts with the religious employee would
cause undue hardship despite the fact that the religious employee was
willing to work undesirable shifts in return for his holidays off and,
therefore, the actual imposition on Brener’s co-workers of a shift swap
would have been extremely minimal.332 Two years later, the Fifth Circuit
again emphasized the importance of employee complaints, determining that
an employer was under no obligation to even pursue a voluntary swap for a
religious employee.333
Employee complaints and grumbling are a growing issue with regard to
parental accommodation in the workplace. In recent years childless, or
“childfree,” employees have become increasingly vocal in their opposition
to family friendly policies which they believe discriminate against
employees without children.334 This resentment is evident in the title of
Elinor Burkett’s book, The Baby Boon: How Family Friendly America
Cheats the Childless.335 As Burkett explains, many childfree employees
feel that they are often stuck working additional hours to cover for their
colleagues with childcare obligations, and that they are more likely to work
less desirable weekend and holiday shifts.336 The question then becomes at
what point this type of “employee grumbling” rises to the level of
constituting an undue hardship.
The Ninth Circuit has taken the correct approach by focusing on the
“actual burden” that the accommodated employee’s colleagues will suffer
and not focusing simply on co-worker complaints.337 The problem with the
Fifth Circuit’s approach is that if employee complaints alone are enough to
constitute undue hardship, a few vocal employees would be able to stop
331. Id. at 143-44.
332. Id. at 146-47.
333. See Turpen v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1027 (5th Cir. 1984)
(reasoning that the employer believed other employees’ complaints regarding such a job
swap would make it impossible).
334. See generally BURKETT, supra note 39, at 25-61 (highlighting the resentment
childfree employees harbor because they feel employees with children receive special
benefits); Arnow-Richman, supra note 3, at 392 (asserting that the perception that parental
accommodation provides special benefits to employees with children is similar to the
backlash against affirmative action policies); Smith, supra note 3, at 1486-91 (raising
concerns from employees without children who feel they must take on an unequal share of
work to accommodate employees with children).
335. BURKETT, supra note 39.
336. See id. at 40.
[A]s the breeder’s rugrats have been growing these years, more and more breeders
have been whining that they need to work such and such hours to pick Johnny up
from daycare or to drop Susie off at school, etc, etc. Over the ten years that I have
worked at this hospital, my schedule has been adjusted to fit the needs of the
breeders, which I think is totally discriminatory.
Id.
337. See supra notes 327-329 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit cases).
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parental accommodation in the workplace.
Therefore, any statute
mandating parental accommodation in the workplace should follow the
Ninth Circuit approach.
At the same time, employers should be obligated to minimize both the
actual burden on the accommodated employees’ colleagues as well as any
inaccurate perception of inequity, which could lead to workplace
resentment. Part of the hostility that childless employees have towards
flexible work policies is caused by employers who permit some employees
to work part-time and then “dump the excess work on existing employees
but pay them no additional compensation for doing it.”338 It is
understandable why colleagues of accommodated employees feel resentful
when they are the ones bearing the cost of the accommodation. In addition,
to lessen resentment, employees should be informed of the business
argument for flexible work arrangements and should also clearly be
informed that employees who work shorter hours in fact receive less
compensation.339 Finally, there are also many employees without bona fide
parenting obligations who, for a variety of reasons, want increased
workplace flexibility and in many cases it would make business sense for
employers to accommodate these employees as well.
This subpart has examined how the courts have interpreted the “undue
hardship” requirement of section 701(j), and how this requirement should
be interpreted in a statute mandating parental accommodation in the
workplace. As explained, “undue hardship” should be defined as a cost
requiring “significant difficulty or expense” and not as any cost greater
than “de minimis.” Due to the long term cost savings that are likely to be
associated with a restructured workplace, hypothetical hardships will most
likely not be a major issue with regard to parental accommodation in the
workplace. However, undue hardship may be found in cases where
accommodation of working parents has a significant adverse impact on the
working parents’ colleagues.
CONCLUSION
Many working mothers and fathers regularly encounter difficulty
balancing their work and parenting responsibilities. Federal law has failed
to adequately protect working parents, and many employers do not provide
sufficient flexibility for their employees who are juggling childcare and
work obligations. This failure of employers to accommodate working
parents has proven harmful to women, men, children, society, and even to

338. See Williams, Difference, supra note 32, at 1450.
339. See Williams, Canaries, supra note 3, at 2236-38 (underscoring how a flexible
work arrangement cannot succeed if company culture is not amenable to it).
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employers themselves. Federal legislation should therefore be enacted to
address this problem and mandate meaningful accommodation of working
parents.
As this Article has explained, the balancing approach of section 701(j)
should be adopted, and employers should be required to “reasonably
accommodate” working parents’ bona fide parenting obligations in cases
where accommodation will not cause “undue hardship” to the employer.
This balancing approach will provide increased flexibility for working
parents, while ensuring that any cost to employers is not overly
burdensome. Although parental accommodation in the work place cannot
resolve the work-family conflict on its own,340 it is nonetheless a crucial
step in ensuring that working parents are not forced to choose between their
jobs and caring for their children.

340. Other steps that the government should take include increasing access to affordable
quality childcare and after school programs, scheduling longer school days and a longer
school year that better matches the work day of the American labor force, and improving
public transportation. HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 181-90.

